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ABSTRACT
SECURING NETWORK PROCESSORS WITH
HARDWARE MONITORS
SEPTEMBER 2015
KEKAI HU
B.Sc., WUHAN UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., WUHAN UNIVERSITY
Directed by: Professor Russell G. Tessier
As an essential part of modern society, the Internet has fundamentally changed
our lives during the last decade. Novel applications and technologies, such as online
shopping, social networking, cloud computing, mobile networking, etc, have sprung
up at an astonishing pace. These technologies not only influence modern life styles but
also impact Internet infrastructure. Numerous new network applications and services
require better programmability and flexibility for network devices, such as routers and
switches. Since traditional fixed function network routers based on application specific
integrated circuits (ASICs) have difficulty keeping pace with the growing demands of
next-generation Internet applications, there is an ongoing shift in the industry toward
implementing network devices using programmable network processors (NPs).
While network processors offer great benefits in terms of flexibility, their repro-
grammable nature exposes potential security risks. Similar to network end-systems,
v
such as general-purpose computers, software-based network processors have security
vulnerabilities that can be attacked remotely. Recent research has shown that a new
type of data plane attack is able to modify the functionality of a network proces-
sor and cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack by sending a single malformed UDP
packet. Since this attack relies solely on data plane access and does not need access
to the control plane, it can be particularly difficult to control.
Hardware security monitors have been introduced to identify and eliminate these
malicious packets before they can propagate and cause devastating effects in the
network. However, previous work on hardware monitors only focus on single core
systems with static (or very slowly changing) workloads. In network processors that
use up to hundreds of parallel processor cores and have processing workloads that
can change dynamically based on the network traffic, the realization of a complete
multicore hardware monitoring system remains a critical challenge. Our research
work in this thesis provides a comprehensive solution to this problem.
Our first contribution is the design and prototype implementation of a Scalable
Hardware Monitoring Grid (SHMG). This scalable architecture balances area cost
and performance overhead by using a clustered approach for multicore NP systems.
In order to adapt to dynamically changing network traffic, a resource reallocation
algorithm is designed to reassign the processing resources in SHMG to different net-
work applications at runtime. An evaluation of the prototype SHMG on an Altera
DE4 board demonstrates low resource and performance overheads. The functional-
ity and performance of a runtime resource reallocation algorithm are tested using a
simulation environment.
A second significant contribution of this work is a network system-level security
solution for multicore network processors with hardware monitors. It addresses two
key problems: (1) how to securely manage and reprogram processor cores and moni-
tors in a deployed router in the network, and (2) how to prevent the large number of
vi
identical router devices in the network from an attack that can circumvent one specific
monitoring system and lead to Internet-scale failures. A Secure Dynamic Multicore
Hardware Monitoring System (SDMMon) is designed based on cryptographic prin-
ciples and suitable key management to ensure the secure installation of processor
binaries and monitor graphs. We present a Merkle tree based parameterizable high-
performance hash function that can be configured to perform a variety of functions in
different devices via a 32-bit configuration parameter. A prototype system composed
of both the SDMMon and the parameterizable hash is implemented and evaluated on
an Altera DE4 board.
Finally, a fully-functional, comprehensive Multicore NP Security Platform, which
integrates both the SHMG and the SDMMon security features, has been implemented
on an Altera DE5 board.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Trends and Security Challenges in Internet Systems
The Internet is a critical infrastructure component in today’s society. The pro-
found impact of the Internet covers almost every aspect of modern life such as personal
communication, business transactions, entertainment, digital government, etc. This
impact is likely to continue to increase in the years ahead.
As the Internet evolves further, the underlying network infrastructure needs funda-
mental advancement to catch up with the growing requirements of the future Internet.
Programmability of network devices such as routers and switches is a critical feature
of the future Internet infrastructure.
In the classic TCP/IP network model (Figure 1.1), a network is divided into
five layers: the application layer, transport layer, network layer, data link layer and
physical layer. Various network protocols have been proposed and deployed in this
hierarchy, and different network devices are implemented in different layers. For
example, network end-systems such as general-purpose computers and workstations
work in the application layer, network routers work in the network layer and network
switches work in data link layer. Traditionally, numerous network protocols and
applications (e.g., File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [73], Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) [39], Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [62], etc) are deployed in the
application layer because of its software programmable nature. The network layer, on
the other hand, has less protocol choices and has remained virtually unchanged for
decades [10]. As a result, Internet Protocol (IP) [72], the dominant protocol in the
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Figure 1.1: Layered networking in the Internet [10]
network layer, is implemented with application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) in
traditional routers [79]. Although the cost of developing ASICs is expensive, ASICs
are able to achieve the necessary performance for multi-Gigabit per second traffic
forwarding. ASIC routers are typically widely distributed in networks once designed.
In recent years, emerging novel network concepts and architectures, such as soft-
ware defined network (SDN) [8,66] and network virtualization [24], have significantly
expanded the protocol choices in the network layer. A large number of new tasks
including security checks [34], data filtering [23], traffic management [18], resource
management [88], etc, are implemented in the network layer to augment the basic
functions of the Internet Protocol [17]. Network routers need to implement packet
processing and data forwarding on a broad scale. However, ASIC-based routers typi-
cally have fixed functions that cannot be easily changed once designed, thus they are
limited in their support of diverse network protocols.
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General purpose network processors (NPs) offer more flexibility to adjust a router’s
functionality after production [36]. These devices have become the computing device
of choice in a large fraction of contemporary network routers. Network processors
often feature multiple software-programmable processor cores which give router man-
ufacturers and network managers the ability to dynamically configure and update
router functionality. A detailed introduction to network processors can be found in
Section 2.1.
A side-effect of shifting from ASIC-based routers to routers with network proces-
sors is that it creates a new class of vulnerabilities and corresponding security issues.
Traditional ASIC-based routers are generally secure since their functionality cannot
be changed after manufacture. In contrast, just as general-purpose workstations and
server processors have software vulnerabilities that can be attacked remotely, net-
work processors have software with potential security vulnerabilities. Such security
vulnerabilities can be exploited to change the behavior of a router. In particular,
prior work has shown that an experimental network processor with a security vulner-
ability in packet processing code can be attacked by sending a single User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet [22] (Figure 1.2). The result of the attack was the indefinite
retransmission of the attack packet on the outgoing link at full data rate. This type
of attack is particularly concerning since it can be launched through the data plane
of the network (i.e., no access to the control interface of the router is necessary). Its
effect can be devastating since routers in the network inherently have access to mul-
tiple high-bandwidth links. Thus, this type of attacks can trigger Gigabits of attack
traffic with a single transmission.
While similar vulnerabilities and attacks have not yet been disclosed for current
commercial router systems, there are no fundamental reasons why they cannot be
found. In particular, network processor software complexity continues to grow as
more features are deployed and thus the attack surface continues to increase. It
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Figure 1.2: Attack on unprotected software-based router [21]
is important to note that even a single vulnerability can limit the operation of the
Internet due to the homogeneity of the network equipment ecosystem. Currently,
the network equipment market is dominated by a small number of vendors. If a
vulnerability in deployed network processor code can be exploited, a large number of
systems can be effected simultaneously. The ability to take down a significant fraction
of all network devices in a short time would allow an attacker to drastically affect
critical infrastructure. Such capabilities are particularly concerning in the context of
cyber warfare (e.g., [61]).
Defenses against attacks on network processors need to match the system con-
straints of these devices. In particular, network processors use simple processor cores
that typically do not run full operating systems. Thus, conventional software protec-
tion mechanisms (e.g., anti-malware software) are not suitable for this domain. In
addition, network intrusion detection systems (e.g., Snort [77] or Bro [19]) are often
only active on the ingress side of campus networks and thus do not protect the In-
ternet core. Software based monitors (e.g., IRM [37]) are able to observe software
execution and take remedial action on operations that violate a policy, but they are
developed in high-level programming languages and require operating system sup-
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port. Instead, hardware monitoring techniques have been proposed as an effective
protection mechanism for network processors [16,21,65].
A hardware security monitor (Figure 3.5) is a module of specialized digital hard-
ware that operates in parallel to the embedded network processor cores and keeps
track of the processor behavior during runtime. It takes executed instructions from
a processor core and compares them with a prestored “monitor graph”, which is an
binary that is generated from an offline analysis of the network application in the
processor core to represent all possible valid program execution sequences. If any
deviation from the expected instruction behavior is detected, the processor core can
be reset by the monitor and continue operating without executing attack code. A
comprehensive discussion of hardware monitors is presented in Chapter 3
1.2 Thesis Overview
Hardware monitors for single core network processor systems have been demon-
strated in prior work [22,57]. These solutions, however, do not address many critical
problems that appear in practical network processor systems:
• Multiple cores: Practical network processors use multiple processor cores in
parallel, and all of these cores need to be protected by hardware monitors.
• Multiple processing binaries: Network processors need to perform different
packet processing functions on different types of network traffic. These opera-
tions are represented by different processing binaries on the network processing
system. Thus, cores may need to execute different binaries and need to be
monitored by hardware monitors that match these binaries.
• Dynamically changing workload: Due to changes in network traffic during run-
time, the workload of processor cores may change dynamically [86]. Thus,
5
hardware monitors need to adapt to changing processing binaries during run-
time.
• Homogeneity: Due to the large numbers of identical router devices in practical
networks, a successful attack on one device can be applied to all the other
devices, thus leading to a large-scale failure.
The goal of this dissertation work is to design, prototype and evaluate a multicore
network processor security infrastructure that can accommodate all these require-
ments and protect routers based on network processors from data plane attacks.
Since one hardware monitor can only secure one processor core at a time, a mul-
ticore network processor needs a scalable processor-to-monitor interconnection archi-
tecture to balance the area cost and the performance overhead. A major contribution
of our work is the design and prototype implementation of a clustered Scalable Hard-
ware Monitoring Grid (SHMG) for multicore NP systems. In a multicore system that
runs multiple processing binaries, dynamically changing network traffic requires the
system to have the ability to reassign the processor cores to different binaries based
on the network traffic at runtime. A resource reallocation algorithm is designed in
SHMG for this purpose. An analytic analysis together with a simulation have vali-
dated the functionality and performance of this algorithm. A prototype SHMG on
an Altera DE4 board [1] demonstrates low resource and performance overheads.
Although processors and monitors in SHMG design can dynamically switch from
one network application to another, they can only run one application at a time. The
secure installation of processor binaries and monitor graphs is indispensable during
the application switch. A secure installation model based on cryptographic principles
and suitable key management is presented to ensure invulnerability. When the control
processor in the SHMG requests a new application from a remote server, the server
first securely deploys the processor binaries and monitor graphs to a centralized mem-
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ory in the network processor through an Ethernet port. Then the control processor
installs the binaries and graphs to processor cores and monitors, if necessary.
Another problem in the network infrastructure is the homogeneity of routers, as
we described in the early part of this chapter. To diversify the security of the routers,
different hash functions are used with monitors in different NP-based routers. To
support this security diversification, we present a Merkle tree based parameterizable
high-performance hash function that can be configured to perform different functions
in different devices by changing a 32-bit configuration parameter input. These hash
values are then used by the monitor to evaluate network processor core performance
on a cycle-by-cycle basis. A Secure Dynamic Multicore Hardware Monitoring Sys-
tem (SDMMon) that supports both secure installation and a parameterizable hash
function has been prototyped and evaluated on an Altera DE4 board.
Eventually, a fully-functional, multicore network processor system which is pro-
tected by multiple hardware monitors is implemented on an Altera DE5 board. This
system supports 10Gbps high speed Ethernet and has the capability to support all
the security features in both SHMG and SDMMon. It has been evaluated at speed
in a laboratory environment using a remote packet generator.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized into seven chapters:
Chapter 2 provides necessary background materials for this dissertation. We first
describe network processors that are implemented with FPGAs in programmable
network routers. Then, we provide an overview of network attacks and defenses in a
computer network. Finally, FPGA technology is introduced.
Chapter 3 introduces data plane vulnerabilities in network processers, and presents
and evaluates a memory based high performance hardware monitor to protect the
NPs from this type of attack. We first start with an example of a data plane attack
7
in a network processor, then two previous hardware security monitoring techniques
are introduced: address-based hardware security monitoring and hardware security
monitoring based on instruction hashing. An enhanced hardware security monitor is
designed and presented by constructing a deterministic finite automata (DFA) from a
nondeterministic finite automata (NFA). The use of a DFA improves the efficiency of
the monitor and reduces the monitor operation time to one clock cycle per instruction
for all cases.
Chapter 4 includes the first major contribution of this thesis: a Scalable Hardware
Monitoring Grid (SHMG) design for multicore network processors. By keeping a good
balance between multicore interconnectivity and resource cost, the SHMG provides
a scalable multicore hardware solution by clustering processor cores and monitors.
Inside each cluster, a scalable processor-to-monitor interconnection is used. A runtime
resource reallocation algorithm is presented to allocate the resources in SHMG, such
as processors and monitors, to different network applications based on network traffic
load. A Java-based simulator is designed to evaluate the performance and effectiveness
of this algorithm. SHMG is prototyped and evaluated using four processor cores and
six hardware monitors in an Altera Stratix IV FPGA on an Altera DE4 board.
Chapter 5 focuses on the system-level security issues in multicore hardware moni-
toring systems. We present a solution to the problem of secure, dynamic installation of
hardware monitoring graphs on the network processors, and then address the problem
of how to overcome the homogeneity of a network with many identical devices, where
a successful attack, albeit possible only with small probability, may have devastating
effects.
Chapter 6 introduces the final result of this research, a complete multicore network
processor security platform on an Altera DE5 board. It consists of four 10Gbps SFP+
Ethernet ports, a four NP core six monitor SHMG cluster, a Nios II control processor
running the µClinux operating system, and a hardware trusted platform module
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(TPM). The platform also includes system software that supports SHMG runtime
reconfiguration, security key management and secure installation of program binaries
and monitoring graphs. Our system is evaluated experimentally by connecting to
another DE5 board that operates as a packet generator and packet collector.
Chapter 7 summarizes this dissertation and provides directions for future work.
Results from the research outlined in this thesis have been published in the fol-
lowing conference proceedings and journals:
1. Tilman Wolf, Kekai Hu, Harikrishnan Chandrikakutty, and Russell Tessier, “Se-
curing Network Processors with High-Performance Hardware Monitors”, IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computers, vol. pp, issue 99, Nov
2015. [85]
2. Kekai Hu, Harikrishnan Chandrikakutty, Russell Tessier, and Tilman Wolf,
“Scalable Hardware Monitors to Protect Network Processors from Data Plane
Attacks”, Proc. of First IEEE Conference on Communications and Network
Security (CNS), Oct 2013. Best paper award. [49]
3. Kekai Hu, Thiago Teixeira, Russell Tessier and Tilman Wolf, “System-Level
Security for Network Processors with Hardware Monitors”, Proc. of 51th Design
Automation Conference (DAC), San Francisco, CA, June 2014. [50]
4. Kekai Hu, Harikrishnan Chandrikakutty, Zachary Goodman, Russell Tessier,
and Tilman Wolf, ”Scalable Hardware Monitors to Protect Network Processors
from Data Plane Attacks”, IEEE Transactions on Computers , vol. pp, issue
99, May 2015. [48]
5. Russell Tessier, Tilman Wolf, Kekai Hu, and Harikrishnan Chandrikakutty, ”Re-
configurable Network Router Security”, in Reconfigurable Logic: Architecture,
Tools and Applications, Pierre Gaillardon, ed., CRC Press, 2015 [82]
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Network Processor
Network processors (NPs) are programmable devices that can process network
packets (up to hundreds of millions of them per second) at wire-speeds of multi-
Gbps [42]. In contemporary routers, network processors (NPs) typically contain
simple RISC-based processing cores which can efficiently manipulate data packets.
The functionality of these programmable processors can easily be updated via soft-
ware updates to provide a broad range of router functionality. Some of the typical
applications implemented as software running on network processors include [26]:
• Packet or frame discrimination and forwarding: the basic function of a router
or a switch.
• Quality of service (QoS) enforcement: identify and balance the network traffic of
different types or classes of network packets, manage congestions, reduce error
rate, etc.
• Access control functions: identify the authentication of packets and allow only
the authenticated packets to traverse the router or switch.
• Encryption of data streams: Encrypt the data flow with hardware-based en-
cryption engines in the network processor.
Network processors have been used increasingly widely in all kinds of contempo-
rary network devices: workstation-based routers [54] [51], programmable routers [78],
10
Figure 2.1: Network processor implemented in a programmable router
and virtualized router platforms [14] over the past decade. Commercial examples of
network processors include Cisco QuantumFlow [25], Cavium Octeon [20], and EZchip
NP-5 [38] with data rates in hundreds of Gigabits per second. Figure 2.1 shows a
multicore network processor that is implemented in a programmable router.
2.2 Overview of Network Attacks and Defenses
In this age of universal electronic connectivity, the explosive growth in computer
systems and their interconnections via the Internet has increased the dependence
of both organizations and individuals on the information stored and communicated
using these systems. This, in turn, has led to a heightened awareness of computer
and network security [81] [15].
The NIST Computer Security Handbook [45] defines computer security as
The protection afforded to an automated information system in order
to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability,
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and confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware,
software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications).
This definition introduces three key concepts that form the fundamental objectives
of computer security:
• Integrity: This term includes two concepts:
Data integrity: Make sure that no unauthorized modifications or destructions
are made to the information and data.
System integrity: Make sure that a system performs its intended function in
an unimpaired manner [81].
• Confidentiality: This term includes two concepts:
Data confidentiality: Make sure that no unauthorized individuals have ac-
cess to the confidential information in the data.
Privacy: Make sure that the information about the individuals who manage
the data won’t be disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
• Availability: Make sure that the systems work properly and the services are
available to the authorized users.
2.2.1 Network Attacks
By the definition of the open systems interconnection (OSI) security architecture
[31], any action that compromises the security of information or makes unauthorized
use of an asset in computer networks can be defined as a network attack. Numerous
network attacks [3, 41,52,68] can be classified as passive attacks or active attacks.
Passive attacks
A passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the system
but does not affect system resources. Two types of passive attacks are the release
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of message contents and traffic analysis. By definition, message content attacks are
attacks that eavesdrop and monitor network transmissions to get confidential infor-
mation in the messages. In traffic analysis, the attacker determines the location and
identity of communicating hosts and observes the frequency and length of messages
being exchanged. With this information, the attacker tries to predict the nature of
the communication that is taking place. Passive attacks are very difficult to detect
because they do not involve any data modification. Neither the message sender nor
the receiver is aware that a third party has read the messages because the data is
unaffected. As a result, a typical security solution for passive attacks is not detection,
but prevention, usually by means of encryption [81].
Active attacks
An active attack attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation.
Active attacks involve some manipulation of the data stream or the creation of a ma-
licious stream and can be subdivided into four categories: modification of messages,
masquerade, replay, and denial of service. Modification of messages includes hack-
ers manipulating some part of a legitimate message to produce unauthorized effects.
Masquerade attacks usually happen together with other active attacks, for example,
modification of message attacks. After capturing a message from the sender, a hacker
modifies the message and masquerades as the sender or a different entity, such as
authorized entities, to transmit the malicious message to the receiver. Replay attacks
happen when an attacker passively captures a message, and retransmits this message
to produce an unauthorized effect. Denial of service (DoS) attacks prevent the au-
thorized use or management of network facilities such as websites, servers, or routers.
An attacker takes control of a large number of devices in the network and bombards
a target facility with a large number of messages to overload it, thus disrupting the
normal operation of the target.
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In contrast to passive attacks that are difficult to detect but mostly reasonable
to prevent, active attacks are difficult to prevent because of the variety of potential
network vulnerabilities. Instead, the defense objective of active attacks is to detect
the attacks and recover from any negative effects. These types of attacks are the
focus of this research.
2.2.2 Security Defense Mechanisms
Firewalls and virus scanners are the most common security solutions on network
end-systems [64]. Firewalls [70] [89] are software or hardware-based network security
systems that examine incoming and outgoing packets and filter out malformed pack-
ets. Based on a variety of applied rule sets, firewalls can be implemented at different
network layers including the application, transport and network layers. They are
useful against masquerade attacks and denial of service attacks that originate from
outside the firewalls. Virus scanners (i.e., antivirus) are examples of intrusion detec-
tion systems [40]. These systems detect and remove malicious viruses and all kinds
of malware, such as browser hijackers, backdoors, rootkits, Trojan horses, worms,
fraudtools, adware and spyware to protect host computers from hacking, phishing,
espionage, etc.
Many attackers target the network control plane in applying attacks such as ma-
licious route announcement and DNS cache poisoning. Defenses to these attacks rely
on secure routing (with cryptographic authentication) [53,80] or secure DNS protocols
(DNSSEC) [55] in performing network communication.
In the network data plane, where traditional passive attacks such as sniffing and
snooping take place [84], data encryption is used to protect data confidentiality and
integrity. Encipher algorithms (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES) [27] and Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) [30]) transform data into a scrambled form that is
not readily intelligible. Encryption keys are used during the transformation and sub-
14
Figure 2.2: Network attacks and defenses classification
sequent recovery of the data. The encryption algorithms are designed in a way that
attackers cannot recover the data without the keys. Secure network protocols, such
as Internet protocol security (IPSec) [34] and transport layer security (TLS) [32], em-
ploy data encryption as well as well-established handshake processes to prevent data
plane attacks like eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Recently, a new class of attacks has emerged targeting the network data plane.
This type of attack aims to disrupt or modify the operation of routers to achieve
denial of service attacks or to use routers to actively launch denial of service at-
tacks. Unlike the attacks that target the control interface of routers [29] and can be
prevented using standard security mechanisms as for end-systems, this new attack
on general-purpose network processor cores can be launched through the data plane
by simply sending malformed data packets [22] and cannot be easily prevented with
conventional mechanisms. This attack is particularly problematic since it targets the
high-performance forwarding component of critical infrastructure. Our work in this
thesis focuses on preventing this type of attack.
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2.3 Overview of FPGA Technology
Although the multicore network processors we protect with monitoring in this
work are initially targeted to field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) for prototyp-
ing, the entire system could eventually be implemented in an ASIC. To assist the
reader in understanding our prototyping technology, we provide a brief discussion
of FPGAs. An FPGA is an integrated circuit that can be reprogrammed by a user
to perform any digital logical function. In contrast to an ASIC that is customized
for a particular use, an FPGA can be used to implement virtually any digital logic
function. The FPGA implementation sacrifices area, delay and power versus an ASIC
implementation to achieve the flexibility [58].
Figure 2.3: FPGA architecture [71]
The most common FPGA architecture consists of an array of configurable logic
blocks (CLBs), configurable interconnections (wires) and input/output banks (IOB).
(Figure 2.3). During FPGA configuration, digital circuits are implemented by cus-
tomizing the CLBs and the routing circuitry using computer-aided design (CAD)
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Figure 2.4: FPGA development flow
software (e.g., Quartus [11] for Altera FPGAs and ISE [87] for Xilinx FPGAs). In
addition to millions of CLBs and wires, state-of-art FPGAs also integrate Block
RAMs, digital signal processing blocks (DSPs) and digital clock managers (DCMs).
Hardware description languages (HDL), such as Verilog and VHDL, are used to
specify programs for FPGAs. After a user provides an HDL design to the CAD
tools, the tools translate the hardware description to an optimized technology-mapped
netlist. Mapping to the target FPGA takes place under constraints of resources, area,
clock speed, and power. A typical FPGA development flow is illustrated in Figure
2.4. This physical design process includes placement and routing steps which assign
design CLBs and other resources to physical resources on the chip and interconnect
them using wires with programmable connections. After assignment, a bitstream is
17
generated for a target FPGA. Downloading this bitstream to the FPGA configures
the device to its appropriate functionality.
In recent years, CAD tools have greatly simplified FPGA application development.
Compared with the long time period required to design, tape out and verify an ASIC
design, the compilation and verification process of an FPGA design is simple and
fast. The typical compilation time of an FPGA design ranges from a few minutes
to a couple of hours. This feature makes FPGAs attractive for rapid prototyping
applications. Since FPGAs typically lead ASICs in process technology, they are used
extensively to prototype new technologies before fabricating custom ASICs [35,59].
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CHAPTER 3
DATA PLANE ATTACK AND HIGH-PERFORMANCE
HARDWARE MONITOR
This chapter explores the vulnerabilities in network processors and gives an exam-
ple of a potential attack that can lead to network denial of service. Hardware security
monitoring techniques are applied to prevent this type of attack.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 introduce data plane vulnerabilities identified in previous
research [22] and review two types of existing hardware monitor designs [16, 22].
Section 3.3 introduces a high-performance hardware monitor design from [57]. In
Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of a high-performance
hardware monitor design using nine NpBench [60] network benchmarks.
3.1 Vulnerabilities in Network Processors
As discussed in Section 2.1, network processors are located at router ports, where
they process traffic that is traversing the router. The typical system architecture and
operation of a network processor is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Due to the very high data rates at the edge and the core of the network, network
processors typically need to achieve throughput rates on the order of tens to hundreds
of Gigabits per second. To provide the necessary processing power, network processors
are implemented as multi-processor systems-on-chip (MPSoC) with tens to hundreds
of parallel processor cores [25] [20] [38]. Each processor has access to local and
shared memory and is connected through a global interconnect. Depending on the
software configuration of the system, packets are dispatched to a single processor
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Figure 3.1: Attack on network processor
core for processing (run-to-completion processing) or passed between processor cores
for different processing steps (pipelined processing). An on-chip control processor
performs runtime management of processor core operation.
In order to fit such a large number of processor cores onto a single chip, each
processor core can only use a small amount of chip real-estate. Therefore, network
processor cores are typically implemented as very simple reduced instruction set com-
puter (RISC) cores with only a few kilobytes of instruction and data memory. These
cores support a small number of hardware threads, but are not capable of running an
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operating system. Therefore, conventional software defenses used for workstation and
server processors cannot be employed. Nevertheless, these cores are general-purpose
processors and can be attacked just like more advanced processors on end-systems.
An attack scenario for network processors is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The premise
for this attack is that the processing code on the network processor exhibits a vulner-
ability. It was shown in prior work that such a vulnerability can be introduced due
to an uncaught integer overflow in an otherwise benign and fully functional packet
processing function [22].
Here we give an example network application that has a vulnerability in packet
processing code and show that if this vulnerability is matched with a suitable attack
packet (e.g., a malformed UDP packet), an attack on a processor core can be launched.
The attack packet smashes the processor stack and leads to the execution of code that
is carried in the packet payload. The processor ends up re-transmitting the attack
packet at full data rate on all its outgoing ports without recovering until the network
processor is reset.
The vulnerable application (Figure 3.2) is a congestion management (CM) proto-
col application [18] that inserts a custom protocol header in the packet header space
between the IP header and the UDP header.
After inserting the CM header, the application checks the new packet size (len1 +
len2) to make sure it does not exceed the maximum datagram length. Exploiting
an integer overflow vulnerability, the boundary check in the CM code can be cir-
cumvented and the stack can be smashed. The vulnerable code is shown in Figure
3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Integer overflow vulnerable code
The variable sum is defined as unsigned short type. In normal cases, this code
works fine. However, if an attacker sends a carefully malformed UDP packet, an
integer overflow would be triggered. For example, if the len1 is set to a 16 bit value
0xfffe (decimal value 65534) and len2 is 10, the packet size value sum will be 8 instead
of 65544 due to the integer overflow. Thus, the malformed packet can pass the length
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check. However, in the actual memory copy process, the application will copy 65544
bytes of packet data, rather than 8 bytes, to the processor memory.
As a result, the packet payload is copied over the stack. The packet payload of the
attack packet is crafted in such a way that the return address is overwritten (Figure
3.4) to direct the control flow to the IPv4 packet forwarding application (which is
library code on the processor core) and the value of the ip dst low field is 0xff. The
port information gets updated with this value (the boxed instruction in the IPv4
code), forwarding the attack packet to all the outgoing ports at full data rate. Due
to the very high data rates of modern routers, this type of attacks can lead to a DoS
in the network in a very short time.
3.2 Defense Mechanisms Using Hardware Monitoring
Solutions to protect network processors from attacks on vulnerable processing
code are constrained by the limited resources available on these systems. Network
23
hardware 
monitor
 memory
comparison
logic
monitoring
information
multicore network processor monitoring subsystem
off-line
run-time
off-line program 
analysis
call
stack
attack detect.
protocol 
processing 
binary
monitoring 
graph
packet I/O
network 
processor 
core
re
c
o
v
e
ry
 
m
o
d
u
le
reset
Figure 3.5: Hardware monitor for single processor core.
processors cannot run complex protection software and cannot dedicate lots of chip
real estate to protection mechanisms. One promising approach is to use hardware
monitors, which have been successfully used in resource-constrained embedded sys-
tems [9, 16,43,65,74,75,90].
The operation of a hardware monitor is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The key idea
is that the processing core reports what it is doing as a monitoring stream to the
monitor. The monitor compares the operations of the processor core with what it
thinks the core should be doing. If a discrepancy is detected, the recovery system
is activated to reset the processor core. In order to inform the monitor of what
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processing steps are valid, the processing binary is analyzed offline to extract the
“monitoring graph” that contains all possible valid program execution sequences.
Based on the information which is used to generate the monitoring graph, hard-
ware security monitors can be divided to two types: address-based monitors and
monitors using instruction hashing. Both of them need to meet the following criteria:
1. Correct detection: Correctly identify malicious attacks.
2. Low resource overhead: Due to the limited resource availability in the network
processors, the hardware monitors need to be designed with low resource over-
head.
3. Fast detection: Since the network processor cores work in high speed, hardware
monitors should be able to detect malicious behavior within one or a small num-
ber of clock cycles to avoid large performance overhead. The less performance
overhead the better.
3.2.1 Address-based Hardware Security Monitor
An address-based hardware security monitor [21] uses instruction address informa-
tion in the processor application binary to monitor processor behavior. Instructions
are grouped into different basic blocks based on their positions to the branch instruc-
tions. All the instructions before the next branch instruction are classified to the
same basic block.
As we can see in Figure 3.6, since the fifth instruction is a conditional jump
instruction, all instructions from memory locations 1 to 5 are grouped as basic block
zero. Similarly, instructions from memory locations 6 to 8 are grouped as basic block
one because instruction eight is an unconditional jump instruction.
The high level architecture of the address-based hardware security monitor system
is illustrated in Figure 3.7 [21]. It is a four stage pipeline architecture where each
pipeline stage takes one clock cycle to complete.
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• Stage 1: Index a block RAM (BRAM) with the instruction address of the
currently executed instruction. The BRAM contains the basic block number of
the instruction and the next-hop address.
• Stage 2: Store the basic block number in a FIFO block and forward it to stage
3.
• Stage 3: Compare the current basic block number input from the second stage
with the block information of the just completed instruction from the FIFO
block. If they are the same, this instruction belongs to the same basic block
and the current instruction is valid. If not, check if the instruction belongs to
the next basic block or the jump target basic block. If one of them matches
with current instruction, it is a valid jump.
• Stage 4: The next-hop address for the just completed instruction is used to
once again index the basic block memory. If the basic block for this target
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is the same as the basic block of the currently-executed instruction, a valid
instruction sequence is determined. Otherwise, an error signal is generated to
stop processor operation.
A problem of the basic block monitoring strategy is that if the attack instruction
belongs to the same basic block as the expected instruction, it can be undetectable.
As we can observe from Figure 3.8, if the attacker injects malicious instructions (2
and 3) in the middle of a basic block (block 0), the monitor cannot detect these
attack instructions. Moreover, keeping track of the basic block information and next-
hop address information for all instructions in the basic block memory increases the
on-chip memory overhead.
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3.2.2 Hardware Security Monitor Using Instruction Hashing
To improve the limitations of address-based hardware monitors, instruction hashes
are used in place of basic blocks to validate processor operation at runtime. A new
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hardware monitoring strategy that can verify individual instructions is designed in
[57].
The monitoring graph used by the hardware monitor is a state machine, where each
state represents a specific processor instruction. The state machine is derived from
the packet processing code as illustrated in Figure 3.9. Each processor instruction
corresponds to a state. The edges between states are labeled with information relating
to the next valid instruction that can be executed after the current instruction. In
case of control flow operations, there may be multiple outgoing edges from each
state (each being a valid transition). In this system, a 32-bit processor (i.e., open
source embedded Plasma processor based on the MIPS instruction set) is used. The
monitoring system uses a 4-bit hash of the next instruction to label edges in the
monitoring graph (as has been recommended in [65]). A hash (instead of the full
32-bit instruction) is used to reduce the size of the monitoring graph and thus to
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reduce the implementation overhead of the hardware monitor while still allowing
instruction-by-instruction monitoring.
 […]
 49c: 97c20010 lhu v0,16(s8)
 4a0: 00000000 nop
 4a4: 2c420033 sltiu v0,v0,51
 4a8: 1440000a bnez v0,4d4
 4ac: 00000000 nop
 4b0: 3c026666 lui v0,0x6666
 4b4: 34430191 ori v1,v0,0x191
 4b8: 97c20010 lhu v0,16(s8)
 […]
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Figure 3.9: State machine generation from processing binary
Whenever the processor runs an instruction, it inputs this 32 bit instruction to
a hash function that generates a hash value (can be any length, 3, 4, and 5 bits are
evaluated in our work) for this instruction. Then, the possible hash values for this
instruction are fetched from the monitoring graph and compared with the input hash
value. It is possible that there are more than one hash value for this instruction due
to the jump or branch instructions that have more than one target instructions. If
the input hash value does not match any of the possible hash values, an error signal
is generated indicating that an incorrect instruction has been executed.
The key improvements of the instruction hashing monitor over the address-based
monitor are:
• An instruction hashing monitor checks processor behavior using instruction in-
formation, rather than address information, thus eliminating the undetectable
attacks in address-based monitors.
• Next instruction information for conditional instructions are determined in the
jump logic, reducing memory resource utilization.
The use of a hash (or any other method that uses a many-to-one mapping), how-
ever, leads to two fundamental problems:
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• Attack detection ambiguity: The many-to-one mapping that occurs in a hash
function of the monitor may make it possible for an attacker to remain unde-
tected. This would require that the attack performs operations that lead to a
sequence of hash values that matches the monitoring information of valid code.
Mao et al. have shown that this probability decreases geometrically with the
length of the attack code and thus is unlikely to lead to practical attacks [65]
(in particular when the hash function is not known to the attacker). We do not
consider this issue further in this work.
• Nondeterminism during monitoring: The many-to-one mapping also leads to
nondeterminism in the monitoring graph. There may be a control flow instruc-
tion where each of the next instructions has the same hash value. As a result,
the corresponding node in the monitoring graph has two outgoing edges with
the same hash value (as illustrated in Figure 3.10). Since this nondeterminism
can continue for multiple such control flow operations, it can lead to complex
implementations [22], potentially slowing monitor performance.
In the following section, we show how we can address the latter problem by con-
verting the nondeterministic monitoring graph into a deterministic monitoring graph,
which is easier to use in high-performance implementations.
3.3 High Performance Hardware Security Monitor
To realize a deterministic instruction-level monitor, the NFA monitoring graph
described in the previous section is converted to a DFA monitoring graph. This sec-
tion describes how to implement a monitoring system that uses this DFA graph [57].
Note that significant portions of the work in this section were developed by Harikr-
ishnan Chandrikakutty as part of [57]. This work was extended through additional
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experimental results, as described starting in Section 3.4, for this dissertation. This
section is provided for completeness.
3.3.1 Construction of Deterministic Monitoring Graph
Tracking nondeterministic finite automate is difficult to implement in practice
since the automaton can have multiple active states. This leads to high bandwidth
requirements between the monitoring logic and the memory that maintains the NFA
since next-state information for all active states has to be fetched in each iteration.
When using a DFA, in contrast, only one state is active and implementation becomes
much easier.
To convert an NFA to a DFA, a standard powerset construction algorithm can be
used [47]. This algorithm computes all possible state sets in which the automaton can
be situated (i.e., the powerset). Based on the powerset, a DFA is then constructed.
Figure 3.11 shows the DFA that corresponds to the NFA shown in Figure 3.10. Note
that state {3,5} represents the sets of states to where state 2 can branch when hash
value c is observed.
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Figure 3.10: Nondeterministic monitoring graph.
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Figure 3.11: Deterministic monitoring graph after NFA-to-DFA conversion.
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Figure 3.12: Grouping of DFA states.
One potential problem with NFA-to-DFA conversions is that the number of states
in the DFA can grow exponentially over the number of states in the NFA. However,
the monitoring NFAs constructed from binary code do not exhibit this pathological
behavior. Experiments indicate that this increase is small and does not lead to
drastically larger state machines (see Section 3.5). Thus, this approach is effective
for creating deterministic hardware monitors.
3.3.2 Implementation of Monitoring System
A key challenge in the implementation of this hardware monitoring system is how
to represent the monitoring DFA in memory. The comparison logic needs to be able
to retrieve the information about next state transitions for every instruction that
it tracks. Thus, state transitions need to be implemented with no more than one
memory access per instruction (to keep up with the network processor core) and be
as compact as possible (to minimize the implementation overhead of the monitor).
The information that needs to be stored in the monitoring memory is illustrated
on the left side of Figure 3.12. Each state represents an instruction and an outgoing
transition edge from this state represents the hash value of the next expected instruc-
tion in the execution sequence. For example, state c has two next states, d and e,
with hash values 11 and 3, respectively.
A na¨ıve way to store the state machine in RAM would be to store each state and
all its possible edge transitions. This would require 2h entries per state for an h-bit
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hash. Since most states have only one or two outgoing edges, a large number of edge
transitions would never be used, leading to inefficient memory use. Assuming that
only two outgoing transitions exist for each state is also not feasible due to the cases
where powerset construction creates states with up to 2h outgoing edges. Finally,
for performance reasons there should only be one memory access per state transition,
which precludes a design where states with more than two outgoing edges are handled
as special cases.
The main idea to compactly represent DFA states with varying numbers of out-
going edges is to encode all the necessary information in a single table entry and to
group states by the number of outgoing edges. The main challenge in achieving com-
pactness is to allocate exactly the amount of memory that is needed for each state
to store next state information while still being able to index this memory without
degrading to linear search. In the representation, states are grouped together if they
have the same previous state. A state belongs to group g if the previous state has g
outgoing edges. For a monitor with a 4-bit hash value, there are 16 possible groups.
For example, in Figure 3.12 on the right side, groups are shown with different colors.
Note that a state can belong to multiple groups (e.g., state f belongs to group 2
(because a has two outgoing edges, one to b and one to f) and to group 3 (because
e has three outgoing edges)).
The memory layout and basic operation of the DFA monitor system is shown in
Figure 3.13. The memory contains tuples of {number of next states, offset in state
group, valid hash values on outgoing edges} and is logically divided into groups. The
base addresses for each group are stored in a register file with 16 entries. Within
a group, the sets of states that share the previous state are grouped together (e.g.,
b and f are together and d and e are together). Within a set, states are ordered
by the hash value on their incoming edge (e.g., e before d because hash value 3 is
smaller than hash value 11). The hash comparison block performs two functions: it
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Figure 3.13: Memory based high performance security monitor architecture
determines if the one-hot coded hash bit is set in the 16-bit value read from memory
and it determines k, which is the position of the matching hash value among the valid
hash values read from memory.
To illustrate the operation of the monitor, an example transition is shown. Assume
the monitor is in state a and the processor reports an instruction that leads to a hash
value of 7. To perform the transition, the memory row labeled a is read. The tuple in
this row indicates that there are two outgoing edges. The valid hash values of these
two edges are stored in the 16-bit vector. To verify that the transition is valid, the
hash comparison unit checks if bit 7 is set in the bit vector (which it is). If this bit is
not set, then an invalid transition takes place, indicating an attack, and the processor
is reset. After the check, the next state (i.e., state f) in the DFA needs to be found in
memory. To determine the address of that state, the base address of the group of the
next state is looked up in the register file (i.e., 0x0002 since the next state belongs
to group 2). To this base address, the product of the set size (i.e., group number)
and the offset in the state group is added (to index the correct set within the group).
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Finally, k is added, which is the position of the matching hash in the bit vector (in
this case 1 since 2 is the first matching hash (i.e., k=0) and 7 is the second matching
hash (i.e., k=1)). Thus the memory location of state f is 0x0002 + 2×0 + 1 = 0x003.
Note that any state transition takes only one memory read from state machine
memory and a lookup into a fixed-size register file. The DFA is represented compactly
without wasting any memory slots (states shown with dots in Figure 3.13 point to
other states not shown in this example). Thus, this representation lends itself to a
high-performance implementation.
3.4 Prototype System Implementation
Although an end-system would likely be implemented in fixed logic, we have proto-
typed the described network processor and hardware monitoring system on a Stratix
IV GX230 FPGA located on an Altera DE4 board. The router infrastructure sur-
rounding the NP core is taken from the NetFPGA reference router [63], which has
been migrated to the Stratix IV family. The DE4 board has four 1 Gbps Ethernet
interfaces for packet input/output. In our prototype implementation, the single-core
network processor is implemented as a soft core and the monitor is implemented
in FPGA logic (using Quartus for synthesis, place and route). Only the memory
initialization files need to be reconfigured on a per-application basis.
The automated offline analysis tool for security monitor generation is illustrated in
Figure 3.14. To run networking code on the processor plus monitor system, the code
is first passed through a standard MIPS-GCC compiler flow to generate assembly-
level instructions. The output of the compiler allows for the identification of branch
instructions and their target addresses. In our current implementation, all possible
branch targets and return instructions are analyzed at compile time. The moni-
tor can handle an arbitrary number of indirect branches to statically known targets
(e.g., return addresses) since the NFA representation allows any number of outgoing
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Figure 3.14: Offline analysis to create state machine memory file
branches. (Our monitor cannot handle indirect branches to statically unknown tar-
gets that are resolved at run time, but such programming constructs did not appear
in any of 11 benchmark applications that we looked at). The DFA-to-NFA conversion
starts with a non-deterministic NFA representation obtained from the compiler in-
formation. Through powerset construction, a DFA is constructed. This DFA is then
converted into a monitoring state machine memory file using the process described in
Section 3.3.1 and is loaded into the monitor when the processing binary is installed
in the processor.
To evaluate our system, nine benchmarks from the NpBench suite [60] were pro-
cessed with this flow. NpBench is a benchmark suite targeting modern network pro-
cessor applications. The benchmark applications are categorized into three specific
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Table 3.1: Statistics for NpBench benchmark applications
Netw. Cate- No. No. No. Max
appli- gory of branch branches branch
cation instr. instr. >2 targ. targ.
crc PPG 276 17 0 2
frag PPG 573 70 3 3
red TQG 802 88 1 2
md5 SMG 3147 211 24 8
ssld TQG 828 91 1 5
wfq TQG 905 112 2 2
mtc SMG 2427 252 2 3
mpls- TQG 1603 322 9 10
upstream
mpls- TQG 1574 276 5 12
downstream
Altera DE4
NetFPGA PktGen
Altera DE4
NetFPGA PktCap
Altera DE4 with 
Proc + Monitor
1 Gbps 1 Gbps
Figure 3.15: Network topology used for experimentation
functional groups - traffic management and quality of service group (TQG), security
and media processing group (SMG) and packet processing group (PPG). A listing
of the benchmarks and their application categories appears in Table 3.1. Since the
presence of instruction branches has a direct impact on NFA-to-DFA conversion and
monitoring state machine memory size, the number of branch instructions for each
benchmark is included in the table. Return instructions at the end of subroutines
often contain numerous targets since a subroutine can be called from numerous other
functions. The number of these jump register instructions with more than two pos-
sible return addresses are listed in the table. Additionally, the maximum number of
target addresses for any branch in each application is also included.
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Table 3.2: Evaluation of monitoring approaches for the DFA approach and a previous
NFA-only approach. The maximum number of memory accesses for the DFA approach
is 1 for all benchmarks.
Chasaki [22] DFA approach
Netw. No. NFA Max. DFA Mem. Mem.
appli- of states mem. states entries over-
cation instr. access head
crc 276 276 2 276 282 2.2%
frag 573 573 3 592 622 8.6%
red 802 802 2 805 847 5.6%
md5 3147 3147 8 3173 3228 2.6%
ssld 828 828 5 829 854 3.1%
wfq 905 905 2 914 953 5.3%
mtc 2427 2427 3 2460 2572 6.0%
mpls- 1603 1603 10 1621 1753 9.4%
up
stream
mpls- 1574 1574 12 1582 1706 8.4%
down
stream
The test topology that was used to verify the performance of our monitoring
system is shown in Figure 3.15. For hardware experiments, packets were generated
and transmitted to the DE4 with the network processor and the monitor at a 1 Gbps
line rate by a separate DE4 card serving as a packet generator. This same card was
used to receive the processed packets from the card with the NP. The packet generator
tool allows for customizing the size and the throughput rate for the test packets.
3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Monitoring Graphs
The results of generating instruction-level monitoring graphs for both our ap-
proach and a previous approach [22] are illustrated in Table 3.2. The number of
entries in the state machine memory (Figure 3.13) for each benchmark are shown
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in the Mem. entries column. A clear benefit of the new approach is speed. In all
cases, only one access to the monitor memory is required for any benchmark (includ-
ing the four shown here). The previous NFA-based approach requires up to twelve
memory accesses for the benchmarks tested and potentially up to sixteen for other
benchmarks. The conversion from an NFA to a DFA does incur a memory overhead
of 5.7% on average for the benchmarks. The hash function used to convert a 32-bit
instruction to a 4-bit hash value involved the summing of all eight 4-bit instruction
nibbles. The result of the summation is the 4-bit hash value.
3.5.2 Evaluation of Hash Functions
As shown in Figure 3.13, each 32-bit instruction is converted to a hash value con-
taining a small number of bits (e.g. h = 4). In Section 3.3.1 it is noted that an
important aspect of the NFA-to-DFA conversion is limiting the number of cases in
which the hash values for multiple edges leaving a state are the same (e.g. Figure
3.10). Limiting these cases avoids the creation of powerset state sets, and the corre-
sponding increase in memory entries in state machine memory. To limit branch hash
value collisions, it is desirable for the instruction hashes to be as evenly distributed
across the range of possible instructions hashes as possible. Additionally, the 32-bit
instruction to h-bit hash value conversion must be simple enough to be performed in
one clock cycle.
Four hash functions were considered for this work.
1. Sum of all ones in the 32-bit instruction (bit-sum) - All binary digits are
summed and the result is used to determine the h-bit hash value. For sums
exceeding h-bits, only the bottom h bits are used as the hash value.
2. Sum of all nibbles in the 32-bit instruction (nibble-sum) - All 4-bit nibbles
are summed and the result is used to determine the h-bit hash value. For sums
exceeding h-bits, only the bottom h bits are used as the hash value.
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Figure 3.16: Distribution of occurances of each hash value for four hash functions.
The results were generated for the mpls-downstream benchmark.
3. XOR of h-bit chunks in the 32-bit instruction (XOR) - The 32-bit in-
struction is broken into h-bit chunks which are then XORed together to generate
an h-bit result.
4. OR/XOR of h-bit chunks in the 32-bit instruction (OR/XOR) - the 32-
bit instruction is broken into h-bit chunks. Half the chunks are ORed together
while the other half (including the final operation) are XORed.
An example of the distribution of 4-bit hash values for all instructions (except
NOPs) for the mpls-downstream benchmark is shown in Figure 3.16. Plots for other
benchmarks are similar. The nibble-sum approach to generating hash values is most
effective in distributing hash values, although some variation from an even distribution
is apparent. This result is likely due to the randomness caused by bit carries in
generating the final hash values for nibble-sum. Note that the results for hash value
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Table 3.3: Comparison of DFA states and state machine memory entries for different
hash functions for a 4-bit hash
nibble-sum bit-sum XOR OR/XOR
Network DFA Mem DFA Mem %Mem DFA Mem. %Mem DFA Mem %Mem
application states entries states entries incr. states entries incr states entries incr.
crc 276 282 276 285 1.06 276 282 0.00 279 287 1.77
frag 592 622 592 627 0.80 592 620 -0.32 592 622 0.00
red 805 847 808 857 1.18 806 850 0.35 807 851 0.47
md5 3173 3228 3208 3277 1.52 3181 3248 0.62 3190 3261 1.02
ssld 829 854 836 878 2.81 831 860 0.70 836 875 2.46
wfq 914 953 921 977 2.52 916 955 0.21 918 960 0.73
mtc 2460 2572 2460 2584 0.47 2459 2567 -0.19 2460 2571 -0.04
mpls-
upstream 1621 1753 1625 1758 0.29 1622 1744 -0.51 1627 1757 0.23
mpls-
downstream 1582 1706 1589 1732 1.52 1579 1694 -0.70 1584 1712 0.35
average 1.35 0.02 0.78
0 in Figure 3.16 do not include the large number of NOP instructions (instruction
0x00000000) in branch delay slots following branch instructions. These instructions
are not used as targets for branches and can be omitted from the analysis.
The use of different hash functions directly impacts the required size of the mon-
itoring state machine memory. Table 3.3 shows that the use of the nibble-sum hash
approach reduces the number of required state memory entries for a range between
0.02% and 1.35% on average. The remainder of the results presented in this section
were generated using the nibble-sum hash function.
The number of bits used in the hash values also affects the amount of memory
required in state machine memory. Although each additional bit added to the hash
value decreases the possibility that an attacker could craft a code sequence that has
the same hash values as the expected code, the bit effectively doubles the size of
the “valid hash values on outgoing edges” field in the memory shown in Figure 3.13.
Table 3.4 illustrates the memory overheads for different hash value bit widths using
the nibble-sum hash approach. The memory size for each hash bit-width is com-
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Table 3.4: Comparison of DFA states and state machine memory entries and memory
bits for different hash value sizes using the nibble-sum hash
Chasaki [22] 3-bit 4-bit 5-bit
Network Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem Mem
application bits entries bits Overhead entries bits Overhead entries bits Overhead
crc 8280 288 6048 -27.0% 282 8460 2.2% 282 13254 60.1%
frag 17190 620 13020 -24.3% 622 18660 8.6% 623 29281 70.3%
red 24060 853 17913 -25.5% 847 25410 5.6% 845 39715 65.1%
md5 94410 3255 68355 -27.6% 3228 96840 2.6% 3227 151669 60.6%
ssld 24840 855 17955 -27.7% 854 25620 3.1% 855 40185 61.8%
wfq 27150 957 20097 -26.0% 953 28590 5.3% 951 44697 64.6%
mtc 72810 2590 54390 -25.3% 2572 77160 6.0% 2567 120649 65.7%
mpls-
upstream 48090 1783 37443 -22.1% 1753 52590 9.4% 1738 81686 69.9%
mpls-
downstream 47220 1727 36267 -23.2% 1706 51180 8.4% 1695 79665 68.7%
pared against the per-application required memory for the earlier Chasaki hardware
monitoring approach.
3.5.3 Monitoring Speed and Effectiveness
Our network processor and monitoring system were successfully implemented on
the DE4 platform. The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory resources
required for the network processor core, monitor, and other interface circuitry for
the router (e.g. buffers, input arbiter, queuing control, etc) are shown in Table
3.5. The NP memory includes space for up to 4096 monitor memory entries. All
circuitry operated at 125 MHz, the same clock speed for the system without the
monitor. Experiments in simulation and in the lab on FPGA hardware showed that
the processor is able to forward packets ranging in size from 64 to 1500 bytes per
packet at the same rate under monitoring as without monitoring (e.g. no slowdown
for monitoring).
We tested the ability of the monitor-based system to detect and recover from
an attack. The vulnerable application code shown in Figure 3.3 was implemented
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Table 3.5: Memory based high performance hardware monitor resource utilization
Resources Secure Network DE4 Available
monitor proc. interface in FPGA
LUTs 140 3,792 37,803 182,400
FFs 26 2,120 38,444 182,400
Mem. bits 131,072 201,216 2,550,800 14,625,792
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6.2. Experimental results 
6.2.1. Attack Detection 
This section explains the experiments performed to test the ability of our proposed 
security monitoring system to detect and recover from an attack. We observed the security 
monitor operation in simulation using the ModelSim-Altera simulator [41], and in hardware 
using an Altera Signal-tap logic generator [56]. 
6.2.1.1. Network processor without security monitor 
We initially tested the single-core network processor operation without the security 
monitor system when the attack described in section 5.1 is implemented. Figure 34 shows the 
simulation results for the behavior of the processor system. The attack packet was received 
through MAC port Rx0, and then forwarded to the network processor. The processor then 
forwards the attack packet to all the outgoing ports of the router and then crashes the router. 
This behavior was also verified in hardware. 
Figure 34: Simulation waveform showing attack packet propagation in the network 
processor system.   
6.2.1.2. Network processor with security monitor 
We then repeated the previous experiment after including the security monitor as 
illustrated in Figure 26. Figure 35 shows the simulation results for the behavior of the 
network processor system when an attack packet and normal packet are sent simultaneously. 
Figure 3.17: i l ef r showing an attack and subseque t forwarding of
the packet to all output ports. This behavior was confirmed using hardware.
and used with the NP to send copies of a packet to all ports of the router and then
crash the router. We confirmed this behavior for a system without a monitor both
i simulati n and in hardware. A series of waveforms that d monstrate this b havior
appear in Figure 3.17. As shown in Figure 3.18, after the monitor was added to
the system, the attack packet was successfully identified, the NP was reset, and
subsequent regular packets were routed successfully. This behavior was verified using
our DE4 hardware setup.
In a final experiment, we evaluated the throughput and latency performance of
our network processor system when attack packets are continuously sent intermingled
with regular packets. Both regular packets and attack packets were generated at fixed
rates from the packet generator system. The forwarded packets were received back
at the packet generator and the throughput and latency were measured. Figure
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Normal Packet
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Figure 3.18: Simulation waveforms showing the identification of an attack packet
and the successful forwarding of the subsequent packet. This behavior was confirmed
using hardware.
3.19 shows the throughput performance of the network processor system for 256-
byte packet sizes for varying ratios of regular packets to attack packets. When no
attack packets are sent, the throughput of the network processor system increases
and reaches a maximum. When attack packets are included the throughput reaches
a maximum, and then decreases slightly before settling down. The average latency
for 256-byte packets of regular traffic was measured at 104 us.
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
The effective use of the Internet depends on reliable network routers that are
impervious to attack. In this chapter, we have explored a new class of data plane
attacks in network processors and described a high-performance monitor for these
attacks that requires only a single memory lookup per network processor instruction.
This single memory lookup is maintained regardless of the complexity of the NP
program using an NFA-to-DFA translation of the monitoring graph. This monitor,
which tracks individual NP instructions, has been verified in hardware using an NP
with a Harvard architecture. The presence of monitoring does not slow down NP
operation since it is performed outside of the operational paths of the NP. Some of
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 Figure 3.19: NP core throughput performance with security monitor under attack
packets.
this material was developed by Harikrishnan Chandrikakutty and originally appeared
in [57].
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CHAPTER 4
SCALABLE HARDWARE MONITORING FOR
MULTICORE NETWORK PROCESSORS
Until now, all the hardware monitor designs have focused on processors with a
single processor core executing a single program or a program that changes very
infrequently. Network processors, however, use dozens or hundreds of parallel proces-
sor cores and have processing workloads that can change dynamically based on the
network traffic [86]. Thus, the problem of how to realize an entire multicore hard-
ware monitoring system is critical for developing effective protection mechanisms for
network processors. This chapter presents the architecture and in-circuit hardware
evaluation of a Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid (SHMG) that provides a solution
to this problem. A lightweight interconnection network between processor cores and
monitors is dynamically configured to form monitoring connections in response to
packet processing needs. In some cases multiple processor cores can share a single
monitor, reducing memory overhead. Results developed using both analytical anal-
ysis and simulation indicate that our monitoring approach is scalable for network
processors containing hundreds of processing cores.
The specific contributions of this work are:
• The design of a scalable architecture for hardware monitors that can be used in
a practical network processor system with a large number of processor cores.
• An algorithm which can dynamically allocate monitors to processor cores as
application packet workloads change.
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• A simulation and analytical analysis of performance of the proposed design
at runtime that considers the effects of dynamically assigning processors to
monitors and the resulting resource contention.
• A prototype system implementation of a hardware monitoring system on an
field programmable gate array (FPGA) platform that illustrates the feasibility
of our design and provides detailed resource requirement numbers.
The results indicate that our Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid and associated
allocation algorithm provide a low-overhead and scalable solution for network proces-
sor protection against data plane attacks, thus securing Internet infrastructure.
4.1 Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid
4.1.1 Design Challenges
The development of a scalable monitoring system for multicore network processors
has several challenges. The use of monitoring should not impact the throughput or
latency of the network processor. For monitors that track individual instructions, each
per-instruction monitoring operation must be completed in real time (i.e., during the
execution of the instruction), so that deviations from expected program behavior
are identified immediately. Additionally, the amount of hardware resources used
for monitoring should be limited to the minimum necessary to reduce chip area and
power consumption. Since network processor programs may change frequently, it must
be possible to modify monitoring tasks for each NP core to accommodate changing
workloads.
These challenges necessitate the design of a customized solution for multicore mon-
itoring. Perhaps the most straightforward monitoring approach would be simply to
attach a dedicated monitor to each individual NP core, following previous approaches
to single-core monitoring, as shown in Figure 4.1. Although this approach minimizes
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Figure 4.3: Cluster configuration.
the amount of interconnect hardware needed to connect an NP core to a monitor, it
suffers from the need to reload monitoring information each time the attached NP
core’s program is changed. Alternatively, allowing an NP core to dynamically ac-
cess any monitor among a pool of monitors as shown in Figure 4.2, while flexible, is
expensive and incurs a high processor-to-monitor communication cost. In the next
section, we describe a scalable monitoring grid system that balances these two con-
cerns of area and performance overhead by using the clustered approach illustrated
in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid with network processor
cores organized into clusters.
4.1.2 Architecture of Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid
Our model of the multicore NP system including monitoring is shown in Figure 4.4.
The architecture includes a control processor that coordinates overall NP operation
by assigning arriving packets to individual NP cores. Each core executes a program
using instructions from its local memory. External memory, which can be used to
buffer packets and instructions for currently unused programs, is located off-chip.
An on-chip interconnect is used to connect cores to external memory and outside
interfaces. In this architecture, processors are grouped into clusters of n processors.
Any of the processors in a cluster can be connected to any of m monitors.
The management of loading application-specific monitoring graphs into monitors
and configuring specific processor-to-monitor connections is performed by the same
control processor used to assign packets to NP cores. Copies of monitoring graphs
for programs that are currently being executed or are likely to be executed in the
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Figure 4.5: Two monitors sharing a single dual-ported memory block.
near future are stored on-chip in a centralized monitor memory. Monitoring graph
information is encrypted when it is transferred onto the network processor via an
external interface. An AES core is used by the control processor to decrypt the
graphs and store them in the centralized memory. The amount of time needed to load
a monitor with a graph from the centralized monitor memory is significant enough
(e.g. tens of clock cycles) that reloading should be minimized. It is desirable to have a
program monitor used by different cores at different times during packet processing,
necessitating a flexible interconnection between NP cores and monitors. In cases
where m > n, a total of m−n monitors are unused at a given point in time, although
they can be quickly activated in a few clock cycles by the control processor, if needed.
4.1.3 Multi-Ported Hardware Monitor Design
To support scalability, we have optimized the structure of single-processor moni-
tors, which are capable of tracking NP core execution on an instruction-by-instruction
basis. The monitoring graph for this class of monitor typically represents each pro-
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gram instruction as a state in a state diagram [57]. Expected program execution can
be modeled as transitions between known states. To evaluate correct processor oper-
ation for an instruction, the progression between states is tracked using instruction
hash values. If the hash value of the instruction from the processor does not match the
value stored in the monitoring graph for the instruction, a deviation from expected
execution flow is detected and the processor is reset. For network processors, this
action typically involves a stack reset and a packet drop. The monitoring graph for a
program can be determined by analyzing the instruction flow of the program binary.
For control flow instructions, multiple next states may be possible in the monitoring
graph, requiring matching against several possible hash values.
The architecture of two monitors that perform this type of instruction-by-instruction
monitoring is shown in Figure 4.5. The monitoring graph, which is stored in a mem-
ory block, includes one entry for each state in the execution state diagram. A k-bit
pointer indicates the entry in the graph that corresponds to the currently executed
instruction. As an instruction is executed, a four-bit hash value of the instruction
is generated, which is then converted to a one-hot encoding. This encoding is then
compared against the expected hash values that are stored in the graph entry. The
next entry (memory row) in the monitoring graph is determined using next state in-
formation stored in the current entry and the matched hash value. The implemented
monitor requires only one memory lookup per instruction, limiting the time overhead
of monitoring.
Although separate hash comparison and next state select information is needed for
each monitor, multiple monitoring graphs can be packed into the same memory block
if the block is multi-ported (Figure 4.5). In the example, the monitoring graph for the
monitor on the left is located in the top half of the memory block while the graph for
the monitor on the right is located in the bottom half. For each monitor, the selection
of which monitoring graph (top or bottom) is used by the monitor is set by a single
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Figure 4.6: Flexible interconnection between processors and monitors in a cluster.
graph select bit which forms the top address bit into the block memory. A benefit of
this shared memory block approach is the possibility of both monitors accessing the
same monitoring graph at the same time without having to reload monitor memory
(e.g. both associated NPs execute the same program and require the same monitor).
In this case, the second graph in the memory block would be unused.
4.1.4 Scalable Processor-to-Monitor Interconnection
The detailed interconnection network between a cluster of n processors and m
monitors is shown in Figure 4.6. In this architecture, any processor can be connected
to any monitor via a series of n-to-1 (processor-to-monitor) and m-to-1 (monitor-to-
processor) multiplexers. The four-bit hash values shown in Figure 4.5 are generated
from instructions close to the processor, reducing processor-to-monitor interconnect.
One of n four-bit values from the processors is selected for a specific monitor us-
ing multiplexer dlog ne select bits. During monitoring, a monitor generates a single
reset/recover bit, which is returned to the monitored processor to indicate if an at-
tack has occurred. In our implementation, this signal is sent to the target processor
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via a multiplexer with m single-bit inputs. The monitor and processor select bits
are generated by the control processor and sent to the appropriate multiplexers via
decoders.
4.2 Runtime Analysis of SHMG
Although the SHMG runtime adaptation can adjust the processing resource distri-
bution at runtime to maximize the system throughput, due to variations in workload,
there may be a situation where more processors need to execute a particular program
than monitors are available. In this case, some processors temporarily block (until a
monitor becomes available, at which point they continue processing). We provide a
brief analysis of the blocking probability of the system and the resulting throughput
for different cluster configurations.
4.2.1 Monitor Configuration
In the n processors, m monitors SHMG system we defined in Section 4.1.2, for
each program i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), we assume that ti represents the average processing time
and qi represents the proportion of traffic that requires this program. We assume∑p
i=1 qi = 1, which implies that each packet is processed only by one program. (The
analysis can be extended to consider more complex workload configurations.) The
total amount of “work,” wi, that the network processor needs to do for each program
i is the product of the traffic share and the processing time:
wi = qi · ti. (4.1)
In order to make the assignment of monitors to programs match the operation of
the network processors, we need to determine how many of the n processors are exe-
cuting program i at any given time. We assume that processors randomly draw from
available packets (and thus the associated programs) when they are available. Thus,
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the probability of a processor being busy with processing program i, bi, is proportional
to the amount of work, wi, that is incurred by the program (see Equation 4.1):
bi =
n · wi∑p
j=1wj
. (4.2)
That is, more processors are busy with program i if program i is either used by
more traffic or has a longer average processing time.
Monitors should be configured to match the proportions of bi for each program.
The fraction of monitors, ai, that should be assigned to monitor program i is
ai = max
(m
n
· bi, 1
)
. (4.3)
Since each program needs to have at least one monitor assigned to it, the lower bound
for ai is 1.
In practice, the number of monitors per program needs to be an integer. We
denote the integer allocation of monitors with Ai. One way to translate from ai to
Ai is to use a max-min fair allocation process.
4.2.2 Blocking Probability and Throughput
Given a monitoring system where Ai monitors are allocated to program i, we need
to figure out what the probability is that the number of processors executing program
i exceeds Ai (leading to blocking). The number of processors executing program i,
Bi, is given by a binomial probability distribution
Pr(Bi = k) =
(
n
k
)(
bi
n
)k (
1− bi
n
)n−k
. (4.4)
The expected number of processors, Ri, that are blocked because of program i not
having enough assigned monitors is
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Figure 4.7: Throughput depending on overprovisioning of monitors for different num-
bers of processors (n).
Ri =
n∑
j=Ai+1
(j − Ai)Pr(Bi = j). (4.5)
The total number of blocked processors, R, across all programs is
R =
p∑
i=1
Ri. (4.6)
Note that in this case, the probabilities in Ri are not independent since
∑p
i=1Bi =
n.
The fraction of blocked processors is then R
n
and the throughput, t, of the system
is
t = 1− R
n
. (4.7)
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4.2.3 System Comparison
To illustrate the effect of blocking due to the unavailability of monitoring re-
sources, we present several results based on the above analysis. For simplicity, we
assume p = 2 programs with w1 = w2. Figure 4.7 shows the throughput as a function
of how many more monitors than processors are in the system. We call this “mon-
itor overprovisioning” (i.e., m/n). In the figure, the overprovisioning factor ranges
from 1 (equal number of monitors and processors) to 2 (twice as many monitors as
processors). The figure shows that only for very small configurations (e.g., n = 2
processors), there is a significant decrease in throughput. For larger configurations,
there is only a slight decrease for low overprovisioning factors. For our prototype
implementation, we choose a configuration of n = 4 processors and m = 6 monitors
(i.e., m/n = 1.5), which achieves a throughput of over 96%.
The effect of clustering is shown in Figure 4.8. Since we need to cluster monitors
to achieve scalability in the system implementation, a key question is how much
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worse a clustered system performs compared to a system with no clustering (i.e.,
full interconnect between all processors and monitors). We denote the number of
clusters with c. The figure shows the throughput for configurations with the same
total number of processors and a monitor overprovisioning factor of 1.5. The full
interconnect (c = 1) always achieves full throughput. As the number of clusters
increases, small systems degrade in throughput slightly. However, if the number
of processors per cluster does not drop below 8, throughput of over 99% can be
achieved. These results indicate that using a clustered monitoring system instead of
a full interconnect can achieve nearly full performance, while being much less costly
to implement.
4.3 SHMG Runtime Resource Reallocation
While the previous section provides an analytical evaluation of dynamic resource
allocation, system throughput based on varying workloads can also be evaluated
through experimentation. In the Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid design, the
control processor (Figure 4.4) assigns programs to processors and monitors. As the
traffic workload changes, the optimal assignment of cores and monitors should reflect
the processing workload. In order to achieve this goal, a resource allocation algo-
rithm is needed to dynamically reconfigure the SHMG at runtime based on network
workload changes.
4.3.1 Reallocation Algorithm
The control processor periodically monitors network workload to assess the current
allocation of processing resources. As network packets enter the network processor,
they are buffered in the external memory in a series of packet queues. Each queue
stores a different type of network packet. The control processor assigns packets to
queues based on processing requirements and the number of packets in the queue
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defines the queue length. Similar, stable queue lengths for each packet type reflects
packet processing balance in terms of number of assigned processors and router pro-
cessing speed. If the queue length increases significantly beyond the average length,
the network traffic is too heavy compared to the current processing speed and more
compute resources are needed for this program.
We assume the total input network traffic is fully utilized, i.e., when the workload
increases for one packet type, the workloads of other packet types will be reduced. As
mentioned in Section 4.1.2, a processor/monitor cluster consists of n processors and
m monitors. The workload of the system consists of p different programs that each
monitor may execute (one program per packet type). For practicality, we assume
m ≥ n and m ≥ p. A fully utilized system where no processor is idle is considered.
For each program i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), ai is the number of processors assigned to the
program and qli(t) is the queue length at time t. If queue length qli increases and
exceeds threshold θ, the required packet processing exceeds the current processing
power and more processing resources need to be allocated to this program. Our algo-
rithm performs this process in two steps: First, the algorithm examines all p queues
to locate a program j which can release resources to program i; second, the algorithm
determines which monitoring resources to allocate to the reassigned program (and
thus which cluster is used). Each step is explained in detail in the following.
4.3.1.1 Identification of Program for Reallocation
In order to find the most suitable program j, the following criteria are applied
during the search:
1. If a queue is empty, select this program to release one processor. If there is
more than one empty queue, select the program that has had an empty queue
for the longest time. For this purpose, an empty time marker tek is used for each
empty queue k to record the time the queue drained. The algorithm maintains
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a priority queue for the empty queue that allows easy identification of the queue
that has been empty longest (i.e., with minimum tek).
2. If no queue is empty, select the program with the shortest queue length that
has at least two processors allocated. (Each program is guaranteed at least one
active processor in the system if it has a non-zero queue length, so deallocating
resources from a program with a single processor is not allowed.)
This queue monitoring algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. A program that needs
an additional core is i and the program that releases a core is j. When a new packet
is assigned to queue i, the algorithm assesses the queue length qli. If qli passes the
threshold θ, an additional processor is assigned to program i. The algorithm examines
the length of all queues to find program j based on the above criteria.
Algorithm 1 Queue Monitoring
1: when qli(t) + 1 . When a new packet comes
2: if qli(t) ≥  then . If queue passes threshold
3: Proga ← i
4: Progb ← 0
5: temax ← 0
6: for j = 0 to p do . Evaluate all queues
7: if qlj(t) = 0 then . If queue empty
8: if tej ≥ temax then . And max empty time
9: Progb ← j
10: temax ← tej
11: qlmin ← 0
12: end if
13: else if qlj(t) ≤ qlmin then
14: if Bj ≥ 2 then . find the shortest queue with more than 1 processors
15: Progb ← j
16: qlmin ← qlj
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
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4.3.1.2 Identification of Monitor for Reallocation
After i and j have been determined, the next step is to select a specific system
processor to switch from program j to program i. To minimize monitor reloading
during the switching process, the selection is made as follows:
1. Identify all unused monitors in the system.
2. If there is an unused monitor that has a preloaded graph of program i, identify
all the processors in the same cluster as this monitor. If there is a processor
running program j in the same cluster, switch it to program i, disconnect the
program j monitor and connect the processor to the program i monitor.
3. If there is no processor running program j in the same cluster, try to find
another unused monitor with program i in a different cluster.
4. If there is no unused monitor that has preloaded program i, switch one processer
j to program i and reload the least recently used monitor to program i in the
same cluster of the switched processor.
After switching resources, several packets must be processed before the effect of the
new configuration reflects on the queue lengths. To prevent additional programs from
passing the threshold soon after resource switching and taking processing resources
from the same program j, a mandatory delay δ is introduced. After one adaptation,
new switching requests will be blocked until δ packets are processed.
4.3.1.3 Reallocation Algorithm Complexity
Overall, the runtime resource reallocation algorithm (RRRA) has two traversal
operations:
• Evaluate all p queues to find j when the threshold θ is exceeded by a program
i. This action which requires O(p) time.
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• Evaluate all monitors in the clusters that include program j to find a monitor
and processor core to use or switch functionality, which requires O(m+n) time.
In total, RRRA has an asymptotic complexity of O(p+m+ n), which is linear in
the number of programs, monitors, and cores in the system.
4.3.2 System Simulation
A Java-based simulator was built to verify RRRA and evaluate runtime through-
put results in comparison to the values determined with the analytical model in
Section 4.2.3. The simulator can generate quantities of network packets in different
ratios, and vary the ratios with time. With this time-changing input network traf-
fic, the simulator assesses the behavior of RRRA and measures the runtime resource
allocation and system throughput.
Figure 4.9 shows balanced network traffic (e.g. the total number of packets during
a fixed time period is the same) for three different kinds of packets. The packet
proportions change from 1: 1 : 1 to 8: 1 : 1, then to 1: 1 : 8, and finally back to 1: 1 : 1
and then decrease to 0. With this input network traffic, for simplicity, we assume
the packet processing time for different packets are equal t1 = t2 = t3. Figure 4.10
shows the number of processors running each program during the runtime in an
experimental system with 16 processors and 24 monitors. The fact that the ratios of
the processors assigned to each program follows the ratios of each packet types in the
network traffic validates the effectiveness of the RRRA. In Figure 4.11, the system
throughput is a maximum shortly after system processing starts, then it has three
obvious transitions corresponding to the three network traffic allocation changes. The
biggest drop happens when the network traffic changes dramatically from 8: 1 : 1 to
1: 1 : 8. With the RRRA, the system can adapt its resource allocation every time the
traffic changes and the throughput quickly returns to a maximum value.
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Figure 4.9: Input network traffic used during simulation.
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Figure 4.10: Processor distribution for different packet types as traffic allocation
changes.
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Figure 4.11: Throughput changes is relation to traffic changes.
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Figure 4.12: Simulation throughput depending on overprovisioning of monitors for
different numbers of processors (n) with two different packets.
To verify the monitor overprovisioning analysis, two experiments were conducted
in simulation. The first experiment considered the simplest case that p = 2 with w1 =
w2, total processor number n = 4, 8, 16, 32, and the overprovisioning factor ranges
from 1 to 2. The results shown in Figure 4.12 match with the previous analysis results
in Figure 4.7. The second experiment kept the assumption of evenly distributed
workload, but extended the program number to three and the overprovisioning factor
range from 1 to 3. Results shown in Figure 4.13 indicate the same throughput trend
as the two programs experiment. Although the upper bound of the overprovisioning
range increases to 3, the throughput is still more than 95% after m/n = 1.5.
The effect of number of clusters on throughput was also measured in simulation.
The experiment was setup with 1.5 monitor overprovisioning, the same as the previous
analysis, and the measured total number of processors were 32, 64, 128 and 256.
Compared to the analysis results in Figure 4.8, results from this experiment shown
in Figure 4.14 demonstrate good consistency.
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Figure 4.13: Simulation throughput depending on overprovisioning of monitors for
different numbers of processors (n) with three different packets.
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Figure 4.14: Simulation throughput depending on number of clusters for different
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4.4 Prototype Implementation and Evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid in a
real system, we have implemented a prototype system.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented a prototype network processor in an Altera Stratix IV
FPGA on an Altera DE4 board. This board contains four 1 Gbps Ethernet ports
to receive and send network traffic. We implemented one SHMG cluster in the
FPGA, consisting of four processor cores (soft processors created using a synthe-
sizable PLASMA processor [76]) and six hardware monitors (i.e., n = 4 and m = 6).
The flexible, multiplexer-based interconnect shown in Figure 4.6 is used to allow any
processor to connect to any monitor within our cluster.
To evaluate the functionality and performance of the monitoring system, we trans-
mit traffic through the prototype system. Packets are received on two of the Ethernet
ports and transmitted on the other two. For each packet, a simple flow classifier de-
termines the appropriate NP program for processing. After the packet is processed
by a core, it is sent to the appropriate output queue for subsequent transmission.
We use two types of packets, which need different types of processing and thus
different monitors: (1) IPv4 packets and (2) IPv4/UDP packets that require conges-
tion management (CM) for processing. The processing code for IPv4 does not exhibit
vulnerabilities, but the IPv4+CM processing code exhibits the integer overflow vul-
nerability described in Section 3.1. We introduce 1% of attack packets, which can
trigger a stack smashing attack in the IPv4+CM processing code.
To generate the monitoring graph, the program is first passed through the stan-
dard MIPS-GCC compiler flow to generate assembly-level instructions. The compiler
output allows the identification of branch instructions and their branch target ad-
dresses. The instructions and branch information are then processed to generate the
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data structure used inside the hardware monitor. This data structure is then loaded
into the SHMG system.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
Our system was verified through a series of experiments that were run on the
FPGA in real time.
4.4.2.1 Correct Operation
To illustrate the operation of our SHMG, we have assigned two cores to process
IPv4 and two cores to process IPv4+CM. Of the available six monitors, two are
configured to monitor IPv4 and four are configured to monitor IPv4+CM (since the
latter is more processing-intensive). All four NP cores execute program code from
internal FPGA memory. The initial configuration of the monitors, program code,
and the processor-to-monitor interconnect is set when the design is compiled to the
FPGA and the bitstream is loaded into the design on system powerup.
Figure 4.15 shows the operation of a processor core and its corresponding monitor
on the IPv4 program. (Waveform figures are generated through simulation in order to
obtain signals; however, the same functionality has been verified in real-time operation
of the system on network traffic.) Similarly, Figure 4.16 shows the operation of a
core on the IPv4+CM program. In this case, the packet is benign and no attack
occurs. Figure 4.17 shows the processing of an attack packet in IPv4+CM. The
monitor identifies the attack since the stack gets smashed and the control flow is
redirected to code that differs from what the program analysis has determined as
valid. The processor core is then reset and continues processing the next packet.
The reset operation completes in two cycles and thus does not affect the throughput
performance of the system (and cannot be used as a target for denial of service
attacks). Other processor cores continue processing without being affected.
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Figure 4.15: Simulation waveforms showing correct forwarding of an IPv4 packet.
Figure 4.16: Simulation waveforms showing forwarding of an IPv4+CM packet.
Figure 4.17: Simulation waveforms showing identification of and recovery from an
IPv4+CM attack packet.
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A key functionality of SHMG is the dynamic assignment of processors to hardware
monitors. In our prototype system, we can trigger the reassignment of processors to
monitors on-demand. In our experimental setup, we switch one of the processor cores
from IPv4 (Figure 4.15) to IPv4+CM (Figure 4.16).
The processor-to-monitor interconnect for the core that was previously processing
IPv4 packets is switched to connect the core to an unused IPv4+CM monitor. The
affected NP core and newly connected monitor are then reset, and processing by the
core commences. After this run-time reconfiguration, three NP cores process packets
for IPv4+CM, while one core processes IPv4.
Thus, we are able to show dynamic reassignment of processors to monitors at
runtime as well as the correct detection of and recovery from attacks.
4.4.2.2 Resource Requirements
The resource requirements for the FPGA in our prototype system are shown in
Table 4.1. The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory resources (Bits)
required for the network processor cores, monitors, switches and other circuitry are
illustrated shown in Table 4.1. A LUT is a n-input, 1-output logic element that
can perform any logic function of n inputs. Each monitoring graph can hold up to
4096 separate entries. The FPGA in the system is able to operate at 125 MHz. For
this relatively small cluster size, the amount of logic needed for processor-to-monitor
interconnection is less than 1% of the total logic needed for the monitors, cores, and
processor-to-monitor interconnect since only hash value, reset, and control signals are
communicated.
To assess the generality of our area results across different FPGA generations, we
resynthesized the network processor cores, monitors, and interconnect to an Altera
Stratix II device. The resulting LUT counts of 14,912, 774, and 92 for the processor
cores, monitors, and interconnect, respectively are similar to the Stratix IV numbers.
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Table 4.1: Resource utilization and dynamic power consumption in the prototype
system
Available DE4 Network SHMG
in FPGA interface processors monitors intrcon.
LUTs 182,400 33,427 15,025 816 96
- 67.8% 30.4% 1.7% 0.1%
FFs 182,400 36,467 8,367 147 0
Bits 14,625,792 2,263,888 2,097,134 786,432 0
- 44.0% 40.7% 15.3% 0%
Pwr
(mW) - 1490.83 388.6 41.76 5.30
For a Stratix II device, an LUT can range in size from 2-input to 7-input depending
on the desired logic function. The distribution of input counts for LUTs across this
input spectrum was similar for both architectures.
The dynamic power consumption of the components, shown in Table 4.1, was
determined using the Altera PowerPlay power analyzer. The monitors and associated
interconnect consumed 12% of the dynamic power of the processors. The network
and PCI interfaces on the board consumed 3.4× more dynamic power than these
components combined. Based on board level experimentation, average time to process
one hundred 256 byte packets is 6 ms. As a result, the dynamic energy to process
100 256-byte packets at 125 MHz is 6 ms × 1926.49 mW = 11.56 mJ.
The throughput of our system including monitoring when processing normal 256-
byte packets and an occasional attack packet is shown in Figure 4.18. The through-
out of the system is limited by the processing capability of the processor cores, not
monitoring. The throughput for normal packets is the same both with and with-
out monitoring. A small throughput reduction is observed in the presence of attack
packets due to the amount of time needed to flush the packet buffer.
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Figure 4.18: Throughput results when processing normal IPv4 with congestion man-
agement packets and when processing IPv4 with congestion management packets if
one out of 100 packets is an attack packet.
4.4.2.3 Monitoring Graph Swap Time Overhead
To better illustrate the benefits of overprovisioning the monitors relative to pro-
cessor count (m > n), we assess the average time required to swap monitors during
a processor allocation for the case when m/n = 1.5 versus the case when a moni-
toring graph must be reloaded from centralized monitor memory for every processor
reallocation. The steps required to perform each task of monitor swapping includes:
identification of a new program i for allocation, identification of a program to swap
out (j), identification of a target processor core and monitor for the new program,
and monitor reload from centralized monitor memory (if needed). The reallocation
operations needed to perform the first three steps in the list were discussed in Section
4.3. The following analysis is performed for a two cluster system with n = 6 proces-
sor cores and m = 9 monitors in each cluster. The control processor operates at 125
MHz, the clock speed for our prototype hardware implementation. Since processor
throughput is one clock cycle, we equate an instruction execution to a clock cycle.
The instructions for the programs are stored in each processor core’s local memory.
The initial allocation and deallocation steps require examination of packet queues
to identify a program i for allocation to a processor and the reduction of one processor
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for a program j (Section 4.3.1.1). Our experimentation using system simulation shows
that 28 control processor instructions are needed on average to identify a program i
which requires an additional processor. An additional 28 control processor instruc-
tions are required to identify a program j that should have a processor deallocated.
Combined, these actions require 0.45 µs.
The tasks needed to identify a monitor for reallocation are detailed in Section
4.3.1.2. This stage attempts to identify a spare monitor which has been previously
loaded with the monitoring graph for program i and a processor core which is cur-
rently tasked with program j. This core is subsequently switched to program i and
the processor core/monitor interconnect is configured for the new connection. The
process of identifying a processor core, swapping its program, and locating a suitable
preloaded monitor requires 197 instructions (clock cycles) on average, based on our
simulation. The configuration of the interconnect between the monitor and processor
core in the cluster requires 3 clock cycles. In total, these actions require 1.60 µs.
In some cases, if a spare monitor with the appropriate graph cannot be found,
a graph must be loaded into monitor memory. To evaluate the average monitoring
graph reloading cost from centralized monitor memory to the dual-ported memory
in a monitor, nine benchmarks from the NpBench suite [60] were processed with an
offline analysis flow. NpBench is a benchmark suite targeting modern network pro-
cessor applications. The benchmark applications are categorized into three specific
functional groups: traffic management and quality of service group (TQG), security
and media processing group (SMG) and packet processing group (PPG). In our eval-
uation, monitor graph sizes generated with a 4-bit nibble-sum hash function were
calculated and the graph read/write times to an on-chip memory were estimated for
each of the benchmarks. The reloading time estimation was based on on-chip SRAM
which is a 200 MHz SSRAM with a 16-bit data bus. Table 4.2 shows the evaluation
results. The average reload time is found to be 13.34 µs.
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Table 4.2: NpBench monitor graph reload cost
Network Memory graph Graph reload Graph reload
benchmark size (bits) time (cycles) time (ms)
crc 8460 529 2.64
frag 18660 1166 5.83
red 25410 1588 7.94
md5 96840 6052 30.26
ssld 25620 1601 8.01
wfq 28590 1787 8.93
mtc 77160 4822 24.11
mpls 52590 3287 16.43
upstream
mpls 51180 3199 15.99
downstream
Based on our simulation, we determined that it was necessary to reload a monitor
from centralized monitor memory 16% of the time during a reallocation for m/n =
1.5. During the remaining cases, a spare monitor with program i was available in a
cluster and could be connected to the newly-allocated processor core. As a result,
the average amount of time needed to reallocate a processor core can be calculated as
program allocation time + monitor/processor identification time + %reload × graph
reload time. In total, this analysis results in an average reallocation time of 0.45 µs
+ 1.60 µs + 0.16 × 13.34 µs = 4.18 µs. In contrast, the amount of time needed if a
processor is dedicated to a monitor is program reallocation time + graph reload time.
In total, for the m = n case, this analysis results in an average 0.45 µs + 13.34 µs =
13.79 µs delay.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
To provide practical protection for network processors, which are multi-core sys-
tems with highly dynamic workloads, we have presented our design of a Scalable
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Hardware Monitoring Grid in this chapter. This monitoring system groups multiple
processors and monitors into clusters and provides an interconnect to dynamically
assign processor cores to monitors based on their current workload. We present the
hardware design of an efficient interconnect for these clusters and show through anal-
ysis that even small configurations can achieve throughput performance. We also
present the results from an FPGA prototype implementation that shows the correct
operation of our system and the ability to perform dynamic assignment of proces-
sor cores to monitors. We show that the system can correctly identify attacks and
recover the attack core so that it can continue processing. The system overhead for
our monitoring system is less than 6% compared to the processor system. Thus, our
Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid provides an effective and efficient mechanism for
defending network infrastructure from a new class of attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
SYSTEM-LEVEL SECURITY FOR NETWORK
PROCESSORS WITH HARDWARE MONITORS
While the design and operation of network processor cores with hardware moni-
tors running one or a small number of preconfigured applications is well-understood,
there is also a need to look at the system-level perspective of the problem. There are
two key challenges for a practical hardware monitoring system for network proces-
sors: (1) Dynamics: multiple processor cores and their monitors need to be managed
and reprogrammed at runtime as network traffic and network functionality change.
(2) Homogeneity: To simplify management, practical networks use large numbers of
identical router devices, which can lead to Internet-scale failures in case an attack can
be developed circumventing one specific monitoring system. This chapter addresses
these system-level issues and presents the design of a monitoring system that can
securely install binaries and monitors on network processors and parameterize these
configurations such that potentially successful attacks cannot propagate.
The specific contributions of this work are:
• Design of a Secure Dynamic Multicore Hardware Monitoring System (SDM-
Mon), which enables secure installation of binaries and monitors on network
processor systems based on cryptographic principles and suitable key manage-
ment.
• Design of a novel, high-performance, parameterizable hash function for use in
hardware monitors enabling the deployment of diverse monitoring systems that
are not susceptible to the same potential attack.
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• Evaluation of a prototype system implementation showing SDMMon function-
ality and performance.
In this chapter, we first discuss our security model. Then we present the design
of our system-level architecture followed by results from our prototype and related
work.
5.1 Security Model
One key requirement for the security of the hardware monitoring system is that
an attacker cannot modify the hardware monitoring graph. If the attacker could
modify the monitoring graphs, an attack could be hidden by substituting the correct
monitoring graph with one that would accept the attack as valid code. Prior and
related work have not suitably addressed the question of how the monitoring graph
is installed in a hardware monitoring system. For embedded systems that execute
a single, unchanging binary (as was assumed in prior and related work), a one-time
installation of the monitoring graph through a dedicated interface can be assumed.
However, for network processors systems that need to dynamically download new
processing code, there is no existing suitable solution.
In the following, we focus on how to achieve the secure installation of valid hard-
ware monitoring graphs. We do not consider security issues relating to the hardware
monitor itself since these issues have been addressed in prior chapters. Instead, the
focus is on the security issues relating to dynamically installing monitoring graphs
onto network processor systems while considering that attackers may tamper with
this process to be able to launch attacks that accept malicious code as valid.
To make the security model realistic in the context of practical network operation,
we consider three entities that are part of the system environment:
• Network processor manufacturer: The manufacturer produces network proces-
sors and router systems and sells them to the network operator. In some cases,
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the network processor is manufactured by a different party and then integrated
on the router system by the router manufacturer. For simplicity, we assume
here that the same entity produces the router and the network processor on it.
• Network operator: The operator purchases the router system with network
processors from the manufacturer and programs its operation for the network
where it is used.
• Network processor device: The network processor device is programmed by the
network operator. That is, the network processor needs to obtain processing
binaries and monitoring graphs from the network operator.
5.1.1 Security Requirements
The specific system-level security requirements for a network processor system
with hardware monitors are:
SR1 Only valid binaries and matching hardware monitor graphs should be installed
on the network processor. Validity implies that the binary and monitor have
been authenticated as being sourced from the network processor’s network op-
erator.
SR2 Hardware monitoring mechanisms should be sufficiently diverse – despite the
operation of identical binaries – to avoid catastrophic failures in a highly ho-
mogeneous network environment in case of a successful attack.
SR3 Binaries, monitoring graphs, and hash parameters should be confidential to
prevent an attacker from obtaining a hash parameter and from “stealing” the
intellectual property of a binary.
SR4 Binaries and monitor graphs should only be identified as valid on one specific
network processor system. This security requirement helps in preventing an
attacker from injecting an binary from a different device.
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5.1.2 Attacker Capabilities
We assume that attackers can do the following:
AC1 An attacker can observe any traffic and inject any type of traffic. To limit the
scope of this work, we do not consider a case where an attacker can block all
traffic on a link. This problem can be addressed through other techniques (e.g.,
multipath transmissions).
AC2 An attacker can generate a monitoring graph that matches a binary that is
attacked with an attack chosen by the attacker.
To enable us to find a solution to this security problem, we also need to constrain
the abilities of the attacker. Specifically, we assume the following limitations:
AC3 An attacker cannot obtain cryptographic keys stored by any of the three entities.
AC4 An attacker cannot break standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms.
These limitations also imply that we do not consider physical or side-channel
attacks. While such attacks may exist, there is ongoing research to develop suitable
protection mechanisms.
5.2 System-Level Architecture
The system architecture for SDMMon is shown in Figure 5.1. The main difference
versus conventional hardware monitoring approaches, such as shown in Figure 3.5, is
the use of signed binaries, monitoring graphs, and hash function parameters. This
approach protects the system from attacks, as we discuss below.
A critical aspect for security and operational functionality is the set up of keys
and cryptographic operations. Figure 5.2 shows the three entities that we consider for
our work, the router manufacturer, the network operator, and the network processor
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Figure 5.1: Hardware monitor with system-level security. Application binaries and
monitoring graphs are signed to ensure authenticity and integrity. In addition, the
hash function for each network processor core is parameterized differently to achieve
heterogeneity.
device. In the following, we explain the interactions between these entities and how
they achieve the required security properties.
5.2.1 Operation and Key Management
The following operations describe the interactions between the entities:
• At manufacturing time: During initial setup of the network processor, the man-
ufacturer configures the device with a public key/private key pair (denoted as
K+R and K
−
R ). The manufacturer also installs the manufacturer’s public key
(K+M) into the device so that a root of trust can be established. The keys can
be stored in hardware logic or a trusted platform module.
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• At installation time: When the network processor is installed in a network
operator’s network, the manufacturer provides a certificate that contains (at
least) the network operator’s public key signed with the manufacturer’s private
key. Using this certificate, the network processor can establish a chain of trust
to the network operator. This certificate may be sent to the network processor
once at boot time or with every reprogramming step.
• At programming time: To program the network processor, the network oper-
ator generates a monitoring graph obtained from the processing binary. The
monitoring graph is then parameterized with a randomly chosen 32-bit hash
parameter. The binary, the monitoring graph, and the hash parameter are then
signed with the network operator’s private key. In addition, the binary, moni-
toring graph, and hash parameter are encrypted with a random symmetric key
(Ksym). The symmetric key is encrypted with the router’s public key to ensure
only the router can decrypt this information. The encrypted binary, monitoring
graph, and hash parameter, the signature, the encrypted key, and the certificate
are then transmitted over the network to the network processor. The network
processor decrypts the data with the provided symmetric key (after applying
the router’s private key) and verifies the authenticity and integrity of the data
with the public key of the network operator.
• At runtime: When the network processor performs packet processing opera-
tions, the processor reports its 32-bit operation to the parameterizable hash
function. The 4-bit hashed operation is then reported to the hardware monitor
that compares it to the monitoring graph.
5.2.2 Parameterizable Hashing
As we discussed in the previous chapters, the hash function used in our system
takes the instruction word executed by the processor core and maps it to a smaller
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Figure 5.2: Security operations in SDMMon.
(e.g., 4-bit) hash value. Monitor graphs with small hash values can be represented
very compactly and processed with a single memory access.
The drawback of using a hashed representation of the executed instruction word
is that hash needs to be computed every processor clock cycle and that hashing is
a many-to-one mapping. The latter can be exploited by a potential attacker by
creating an attack that hijacks the processor with an instruction sequence that is
identical to the hash values expected by the monitor. To provide security from such
an attack, our SDMMon uses different hash function parameters on each router and
these parameters are communicated securely between network operator and router.
Thus, an attacker cannot know what hash function to expect and the only viable
attack would be a brute force enumeration of different hash sequences. The use of
different hash parameters on different routers also ensures that a potentially successful
brute force attack on one system cannot be exploited on other systems.
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Figure 5.3: Parameterizable hash function based on Merkle tree.
The design challenge for the hash function used in our hardware monitoring sys-
tem is to provide good hash characteristics while allowing a high-performance imple-
mentation. Cryptographic hash functions would be a great choice since they can be
parameterized with a cryptographic key and achieve strong collision resistance, but
they require too much processing complexity. Instead, we aim for a hash function
with weak collision resistance that can be implemented efficiently in hardware.
We base our hash function design on a Merkle tree [67], as shown in Figure 5.3.
The tree structure can be efficiently implemented in hardware and requires only a
logarithmic number of dependent operations based on the instruction and parameter
length. Each tree node computes an 8-to-4 bit compression function as part of the
overall hash calculation. Leaf nodes take 4 bits from the hash function parameter
and 4 bits from the processor instruction.
Without knowledge of the parameter used in the calculation, an attacker cannot
guess the mapping of a potential 32-bit attack instruction to its 4-bit hash. As
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discussed above, brute force probing is possible, but difficult to implement for longer
attacks.
5.2.3 Security Properties
Based on our system-level design of secure transmission of binaries and monitoring
graphs, as well as the use of a hash function with different parameters for different
router systems, we can now illustrate how our security requirements can be achieved.
1. Security requirement SR1 (only valid binaries installed) is achieved because the
packages of binaries and monitoring graphs are signed by the network operator.
Because the attacker cannot obtain the network operator’s private key (AC3
and AC4) and because only valid network operators receive certificates from
the manufacturer, the packages have to be authentic.
2. Security requirement SR2 (hardware monitor diversity) is achieved because each
monitor instance uses a different, randomly chosen, hash parameter. The at-
tacker can try to generate an attack that matches (AC2), but would need to do
that using a very inefficient brute-force approach.
3. Security requirement SR3 (confidentiality) is achieved because the components
of the package are encrypted with a symmetric key that is only available to the
network operator and the router (because of AC3 and AC4). The attacker can
observe the package (AC1), but cannot interpret the content.
4. Security requirement SR4 (binaries and monitor graphs specific to single system)
is achieved because the symmetric encryption key is encrypted with the router’s
public key. Therefore, only the router for which a package is intended can
correctly decrypt the information in it (again because of AC3 and AC4).
Because we can ensure that our security requirements are maintained, we claim
to achieve system-level security for network processors with hardware monitors.
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Table 5.1: System-level security prototype resource use on DE4 FPGA
Available Nios II NP core with
on FPGA contr. proc. hw monitor
LUTs 182,400 13,477 41,735
FFs 182,400 16,899 40,590
Memory bits 14,625,792 497,976 2,883,088
5.3 Prototype System Implementation
To illustrate how a secure system for network processors with hardware monitors
can be implemented in practice, we present results from a prototype implementation.
5.3.1 System Setup
We have implemented a prototype SDMMon (Figure 5.4) in an Altera Stratix IV
FPGA on an Altera DE4 board. A reconfigurable network processor was implemented
with a PLASMA processor and a reconfigurable hardware monitor was connected
to this NP. For the security and dynamic control purpose, a Nios II soft processor
was implemented as the control processor. The board contains four 1Gbps Ethernet
ports, through which the control processor can reach the network operator’s server.
The system can download, decrypt, and verify the binaries and monitor graphs, load
the binaries and graphs to the shared memory, and reconfigure the network processor
and hardware monitor. We have installed a µClinux operating system in the Nios II
core to provide essential service support such as TCP/IP, FTP, SSH, and OpenSSL.
The relative size of the control processor compared to a network processor core
with hardware monitor is shown in Table 5.1. The control processor, which performs
all the security operations, is only about one third the size of a network processor core
with hardware monitor. In addition to the resources shown in the table, the control
processor also requires 2895kB of memory for the operating system image.
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Figure 5.4: Prototype network processor system with system-level security manage-
ment configuration
5.3.2 Binary and Monitoring Graph Installation
We have implemented the decryption and verification steps on the embedded
control processor of the network processor system. All cryptographic operations use
the commercial-grade OpenSSL toolkit (version 1.01e).
We generate public/private key pairs for all three entities – network processor
manufacturer, network operator, and network processor device – using the RSA al-
gorithm with key length of 2048 bits. We sign the operator’s public key with the
manufacturer’s private key to create a certificate to establish a chain of trust.
The package of binary (for IPv4+CM), monitoring graph, and hash parameter
is signed with the operator’s private key. Since the package size exceeds the RSA
algorithm’s capacity to encrypt it, we encrypted the package using a randomly chosen
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Table 5.2: Processing of security functions on Nios II
Step Time (s)
Download data from FTP server 1.90
Check manufacturer certificate of
network operator’s public key K+O
3.33
Decrypt AES key Ksym using
router’s private key K−R
8.74
Decrypt package with AES key
Ksym
7.73
Verify packet signature with net-
work operator’s public key K+O
3.92
Total 25.62
Total (no networking or certificate
check)
20.39
AES symmetric key. That symmetric key is then encrypted with the router’s public
key to allow secure exchange.
At the network processor device, we verify the certificate to make sure the operator
is indeed the operator and not an attacker. We also decrypt the AES key using the
router’s private key, making it able to access the package upon decryption of the AES
algorithm. We can then verify the signature using the operator’s public key. Finally,
we unpack the package and obtain the binary, monitoring graph, and hash parameter.
These files are then installed in the memory network processor device.
The running times of the various steps taken on the control processor are shown
in Table 5.2. The total time is about 25 seconds, which is acceptable since new
processing applications for network processors are created at slower time scales. (Note
that switching between applications already installed on the network processor can
be done quickly to accommodate dynamic changes in workload by keeping multiple
binaries and graphs in memory.) When skipping the certificate check (which has to
be done only once) and ignoring network delay (which can be decreased based on
server location), then the verification time is around 20 seconds.
85
Table 5.3: Implementation cost of hash functions
Bitcount hash Merkle tree hash
LUTs 103 95
FFs 61 61
Memory bits 0 32
Figure 5.5: Distribution of hash values using our Merkle-tree-based hashing.
5.3.3 Hash Function Evaluation
We have also implemented the parameterizable hash function on the prototype
system. As compression function f , we use the 4-bit arithmetic sum of both 4-bit
inputs. The resource consumption of the implementation of the hash function is
shown in Table 5.3. For comparison, the resources for a typical conventional hash
function (counting set bits in the word to hash) are also shown. It can be seen that
the resource requirements are comparable. Our Merkle tree hash requires less logic,
but requires memory to store the parameter, whereas the bitcount hash does not
require memory. Both hash functions are fast enough to compute the hash within the
available cycle time on our system.
To show that the parameterizable hash function based on Merkle trees is effective
for our goal, i.e., providing diversity across systems (security requirement SR2), we
evaluate the distribution of generated hash values. We do this by randomly creating
32-bit value pairs (i.e., two different processor instructions) and comparing their 4-bit
hashed value pair. As a comparison metric, we use the Hamming distance between
each pair, which is an indication on the number of bits that is different between
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the values in the pair. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of Hamming distances for
hashed values for each possible Hamming distance of the original pair. The Hamming
distance between 4-bit hashed value pairs can take on values 0 . . . 4 and thus each
distribution consists of five bars. Ideally, the hash function creates an approximation
of a Gaussian distribution for all pairs with Hamming distance other than zero. For
a Hamming distance of zero (i.e., elements are identical), the Hamming distance of
the hashed values also needs to be zero to guarantee consistent hashing of the same
value. In the figure, we can see that for all but the most extreme Hamming distance
of input pairs, the ideal distribution is achieved. Since the hash function is symmetric
for hashed value and parameter value, the same distribution properties hold true for
different parameter values. Thus, an attacker cannot determine the hash values of a
code sequence without knowing the hashing parameter. Also, diversity of monitoring
across routers is achieved since different parameter values lead to different hash values
in the monitoring graph.
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
We have presented a system-level security design that ensures that hardware mon-
itors on network processors can be programmed dynamically, while ensuring that
attackers cannot tamper with the monitoring system. Our design is based on the
use of cryptographic principles to securely transfer all the necessary data to the net-
work processor. We have also designed a parameterizable hash function that allows
monitoring graphs to be customized to each individual router system in order to pro-
tect from a cascading attack. We have demonstrated the operation of our system in
hardware on an FPGA-based platform. We believe that this work provides an impor-
tant contribution toward moving from device-level security to system-level security
in embedded hardware monitoring.
87
CHAPTER 6
COMPLETE SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION OF
MULTICORE NETWORK PROCESSOR SECURITY
PLATFORM
In earlier chapters, we have described techniques to protect network processors
from data plane attacks by introducing security system components including a hard-
ware security monitor, scalable hardware monitor grid, parameterized hashing, and
monitor graph download management. In this chapter, we introduce the design of a
comprehensive multicore NP security platform that includes these components. The
system implementation on an Altera DE5 development board [2] will be described in
detail.
6.1 Design Challenges
To provide a complete integration of our ideas, additional challenges must be
met. These challenges include addressing increased Internet speeds, FPGA device size
limits, and user interfaces. In this chapter we integrate our work on an Altera DE5
board which includes a 10 Gbps Ethernet interface. Additional extensions include:
1. A Linux operating system [33] is used to support network and cryptographic
services such as TCP/IP [72], FTP [73] and OpenSSL [6]. To promote security,
the communication between the OS and the hardware is carefully designed.
Physical addresses are remapped to virtual addresses by a memory management
unit (MMU) and device drivers are used by the OS to recognize customized
hardware modules.
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Figure 6.1: System architecture of the multicore network processor security platform
2. As described in Section 5.2.1, security keys must be installed in the NP system at
both manufacturing and installation time. To prevent attackers from stealing
these keys using software based attacks, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
must be used to securely store these keys.
3. In order to verify the functionality of the multicore NP security platform sys-
tem, a network packet generator, which can send and capture network packets
through 10G SFP+ ports, is designed for the DE5 board so that multiple DE5
boards can be connected for experiments.
6.2 Multicore NP Security Platform System Architecture
The system architecture of our complete platform is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The
platform consists of four 10G SFP+ high speed Ethernet ports, a DDR3 SDRAM main
memory, a Nios II control processor, a customized TPM module, and the Scalable
Hardware Monitoring Grid (SHMG) logic. As the fundamental hardware component
in the system, the SHMG includes input and output arbiters that interface to the
10G Ethernet ports, queues and queue management logic that buffer input network
packets, and a multi-core multi-monitor cluster. The system hardware gets network
packets from the 10G network port, identifies the packet types and distributes the
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packets to NP cores, monitors the packet processing in the NP cores, and forwards
the packets to corresponding output network ports after processing them.
To achieve the system level security features described in Chapter 5, a µClinux OS
is installed in the Nios II control processor to support the network and cryptographic
services. Linux based device drivers and C software are designed to implement the
following key functions:
1. Communicate with a remote server through an Ethernet interface and securely
download encrypted processor binaries and monitor graphs from the server when
necessary.
2. Communicate with the TPM module to get security keys, decrypt the processor
binaries and monitor graphs and put them into processor memory and monitor
memory.
3. Monitor the queue lengths in the hardware. When a queue length passes a
pre-configured threshold, partially reconfigure the processors and monitors and
the interconnection between the processors and monitors in SHMG without
affecting the work of other processors and monitors.
We introduce the details of the hardware and software implementations and present
system evaluation experimental results in the remainder of this chapter.
6.3 System Hardware Implementation
Compared with the Altera DE4 board used for experiments in previous chapters,
the DE5 has significantly more FPGA and memory resources and supports 10G rather
than 1G Ethernet interfaces.
90
Table 6.1: Key features of DE4 vs DE5.
DE4 DE5
FPGA EP4SGX230C2 5SGXEA7N2F45C2
Logic elements 228,000 622,000
On-chip memory 17,133Kb 50Mb
DRAM DDR2 SO-DIMM DDR3 SO-DIMM
Ethernet interface Gigabit Ethernet (GigE) 10G SFP+
6.3.1 Altera DE5 FPGA Board
The Altera DE5 development and education board features a Stratix V GX FPGA
and integrates transceivers that transfer data at a maximum of 12.5 Gbps, allowing
low-latency, straight connections to four external 10G SFP+ modules. Table 6.1
compares the DE5 key features with those in the DE4.
6.3.2 10 Gbps Ethernet
The DE5 board has four independent 10G SFP+ connectors that use one transceiver
channel each from the Stratix V GX FPGA device. These modules take in serial data
from the Stratix V GX FPGA device and transform them to optical signals [2]. Al-
tera provides 10 Gbps Ethernet (10GbE) Media Access Controller (MAC) [12] and
10GBASE-R PHY [13] IP components to handle the SFI interface with a optical
SFP+ running at 10.3125 Gbps. A complete 10 Gbps Ethernet solution (shown in
Figure 6.2) must include both the 10G Ethernet MAC and the 10GBASE-R PHY.
The 10Gbps Ethernet MAC IP core is a configurable component that implements
the IEEE 802.3-2008 specification. It uses the Avalon streaming (Avalon-ST) interface
on the client side to talk with the user defined hardware module and the single data
rate (SDR) XGMII on the network side to talk with the 10GBASE-R PHY.
The Altera 10GBASE-R PHY IP core implements the functionality described in
IEEE Standard 802.3 Clause 45 [4]. It delivers serialized data to an optical module
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Figure 6.2: 10 Gbps Ethernet Solution.
that drives optical fiber at a line rate of 10.3125Gbps. In our system, since there are
four connectors, we use a 4-channel implementation of 10GBASE-R, each channel of
the 10GBASE-R PHY IP core operates independently.
6.3.3 Scalable Hardware Monitoring Grid Implementation
We have implemented a four NP core, six monitor SHMG cluster (Figure 4.6) in
our system. The NP cores are 32-bit MIPS soft processors created using a synthe-
sizable PLASMA processor [76]. Two different network applications (IPv4 and IPv4
with congestion management) are cross compiled to the processor cores and monitor
graphs are generated as described in Section 3.3.1. Both the processor cores and the
monitors are modified to support runtime application switches.
When a network packet arrives from the 10GbE MAC, it goes through an input
arbiter that identifies its packet types and distributes it to an appropriate queue.
Whenever a NP core is available, it fetches a packet from its corresponding queue. At
runtime, if one queue passes the predefined threshold, the queue management unit
generates a “reconfiguration required” message to software in the µClinux OS. The
software reads all queue lengths from hardware to determine which processor and
monitor will be reallocated.
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6.3.4 Trusted Platform Module
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated microprocessor or circuit that
stores keys, passwords and digital certificates. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[7] was chartered to create the TPM specification. Typically, a TPM is affixed to the
motherboard of a PC to ensure the security of the information stored there from
external software attack and physical theft.
In our design, we have implemented a hardware TPM as a system module instead
of using a separate TPM chip. It communicates with the Nios II control processor
and the SHMG through an Avalon MM bus. In this TPM module, a unique 2048-bit
RSA public key/private key pair is stored as the router’s keys: K+R and K
−
R . They can
be used to verify the authentication of the hardware device, as described in Section
5.2.1. The 2048-bit RSA public key of the manufacturer K+M and the manufacturer
provided certificate that contains the network operator’s public key K+O signed with
the manufacturer’s private key K−M are also stored in the TPM. Using these keys
and certificate, the network processor can establish a chain of trust from the network
manufacturer to the network operator. In our implementation, we use Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA-1) [69] to generate the certificate. SHA-1 is the most widely used
SHA function, and it is employed in several widely used applications and protocols.
We wrote a device driver for this TPM in µClinux OS so that user space software
is able to read the keys from the hardware. During program update, the keys are read
by the control processor and used to verify and decrypt the binary and monitoring
graph package following the steps in Section 5.3.2. Any software modification to the
keys in the TPM is not allowed. Device driver development is described in Appendix
A.
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6.4 DE5-Based Packet Generator
In order to test and evaluate our NP security platform, we need to send network
packets through the 10G SFP+ interfaces and measure output performance. Thus, a
circuit that performs packet generation and network packet capture through the 10G
SFP+ connectors is an essential part of the system design. For this purpose, we have
designed and implemented a network packet generator for the Altera DE5.
The DE5 packet generator implements two major functions: (1) it generates and
sends network traffic to the 10Gbps Ethernet ports with customized packet size,
packet type, number of packets, and throughput rate and (2) it captures network
packets from 10Gbps Ethernet ports and measures the number of packets of different
types and the throughput of the network.
The system architecture of the packet generator is shown in Figure 6.3. The DE5
FPGA board connects to a host PC through the PCI Express bus. Users of the packet
generator use the DE5 packet generator configuration utility software to read pcap
format network packets and select a customized packet size, number and throughput
rate. The software configures the hardware packet composer with these user selected
parameters through the PCIe interface and the hardware packet composer generates
the network traffic. Incoming network packets from any of the four 10GbE ports is
captured by the packet capturer and traffic statistics are logged and sent to the PC
software through the PCIe interface. Software records these statistics.
We used Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 to develop the PC software and 32-bit Jungo
Win Driver [5] to establish communication between the host PC and the Altera DE5
board. Win Driver exposes two APIs (OnRCSlaveWrite and OnRCSlaveRead) for
applications to read and write using the PCI Express bus.
This DE5 network packet generator together with a DE5 reference router has
been published online as an open source project at http://www.ecs.umass.edu/
ece/tessier/rcg/netfpga-de5/index.html. An online tutorial is available which
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Figure 6.3: System Architecture of the DE5 Packet Generator
describes the steps needed to download the DE5 NetFPGA packet generator design,
compile the design using Altera Quartus II software, and use the packet generator.
6.5 Experiments and Results
6.5.1 Evaluation Metrics
Three evaluation metrics are used to verify the DE5 Multicore NP Security Plat-
form system:
1. Correctness of functionality: The system is able to process network packets,
detect and recover from the attack packets, correctly read security keys from
the TPM and decrypt binary and monitor graph package, and dynamically
reconfigure the SHMG at run time.
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2. Resource utilization: The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory re-
sources (bits) utilization of the system are assessed.
3. Throughput: The system throughput performance is measured and compared
with the throughput results in Chapter 4.
Details of these experiments are provided below.
6.5.2 Functionality Validation
The following experiments are performed to validate the functionality of our sys-
tem:
1. Correct network packet processing: The system is connected to a packet gener-
ator as shown in Figure 6.4. IPv4 and IPv4+CM packets are sent through one
10GbpE port to the system and captured on another port. 500 IPv4 packets
and 500 IPv4+CM packets were sent in 10 experiments (100 packets are sent
each time). All packets were correctly received.
Figure 6.4: Multicore NP security platform test scenario
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2. Attack detection: Normal packets combined with attack packets are sent. We
verify that the normal packets are processed appropriately and the attack pack-
ets are detected and discarded. In our experiment, we used one port to send
normal packets (MAC 2), one port to send attack packets (MAC 0) and one
port to receive packets (MAC 3). 100 normal packets were sent with 1 attack
packet and the results showed that the normal packets were forwarded and the
attack packets were discarded.
3. Dynamic resource reallocation: Since it is not possible to measure the intermedi-
ate status of the processor cores nor the runtime throughput changes before the
packet generator receives all the packets, it is not possible to directly keep track
of the runtime resource reallocation in the hardware. However, this experiment
is designed to show that the control processor has the ability to reconfigure the
SHMG at runtime.
The processor cores are configured to perform different actions: half of the cores
(2 total) forward packets to MAC 3 and half of them (2 total) forward packets
to MAC 1. For each 100 packets sent to the system through MAC 2, 50 packets
are output via MAC 1 and 50 packets are output via MAC 3. Subsequently, one
processor core is reconfigured to forward packets to MAC 1 instead of MAC 3.
For each 100 packets sent to the system, 75 packets come from MAC 1 and 25
packets come from MAC 3. This experiment shows that the system is capable
of reconfiguring the SHMG at runtime.
4. TPM driver test: We store a 32-bit number (0x12344321 in the experiment) in
the TPM hardware and use sample user code to read and print it on the µClinux
console. The result is shown in Figure 6.5. In the key management operations,
two 2048-bit RSA keys K+M , K
−
R and the certificate of K
+
O are provided to
µClinux for package decryption.
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Figure 6.5: TPM test result
5. Secure binary and monitoring graph installation: We have performed experi-
ments similar to those in Section 5.3.2 to evaluate the processing time of the
security functions in our system. The experimental results are listed in Table
6.2. Note that there are two modifications in this experiment compared to the
previous one:
(a) Although FTP service is supported in our system, since there is no re-
mote FTP host that supports the 10Gbps SFP+ interface, we did not
perform downloading measurements in the experiment. The data package
was preloaded into the system.
(b) Since the security keys are stored in the hardware TPM, not in the OS
file system, one extra step is needed to read the keys from the hardware
before the decryption operations.
Most of the security functions run faster in this system than in the DE4 system
(Table 6.2) because the Nios II in this system runs at higher clock frequency
(156.25 MHz vs 125 MHz). The time cost of decrypting the AES key using the
router’s private key takes a longer time because we use a different OpenSSL
utility to do the decryption in this experiment.
6.5.3 Resource Utilization
The resource utilization of our system is shown in Table 6.3. The lookup table
(LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory resources (bits) are listed for different components:
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Table 6.2: Processing time of security functions on DE5
Step Time (s)
Load keys from hardware TPM 1.15
Check manufacturer certificate of
network operator’s public key K+O
1.77
Decrypt AES key Ksym using
router’s private key K−R
15.98
Decrypt package with AES key
Ksym
3.13
Verify packet signature with net-
work operator’s public key K+O
2.08
Total 24.11
Total (no certificate check) 22.34
Table 6.3: Multicore NP Security Platform Resource Utilization on DE5 FPGA
Resources Secure Network Nios II DE5 Available
monitors proc. contr. proc. interface in FPGA
LUTs 552 16,051 2,168 30,036 234,720
1.1% 32.9% 4.5% 61.5% -
FFs 114 8,452 2,532 40,483 234,72
0.2% 16.4% 4.9% 78.5% -
Mem. bits 786,432 1,179,648 70,336 8,060,856 52,428,800
7.8% 11.7% 0.7% 79.8% -
the four network processor cores, six hardware monitors, Nios II control processor and
other circuitry. In addition, the µClinux kernel image needs 5078 Kb in the SDRAM.
6.5.4 System Throughput
The throughput of our system is measured with two network packet sizes: 64-byte
and 256-byte (Figure 6.6). The maximum system throughput is similar to the one
shown in Figure 4.18. This shows that the throughout of the system is limited by the
processing capability of the processor cores, not the network port speed. An increase
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Figure 6.6: Throughput results when processing 64-byte and 256-byte IPv4+CM
packets.
in the total number of cores increases the system throughput. The average latency
for 256-byte packets of regular traffic was measured at 92 us.
6.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter presents an integration of various components of the dissertation
research. A multicore network processor security platform has been implemented on
a DE5 development board. The system hardware and software implementations are
described in detail and system results demonstrate its effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we focus on security issues in network processor systems with
hardware monitors. A detailed, multicore monitoring approach has been developed.
This system is scalable and allows for fast run-time changes to system function. We
are able to download new monitoring graphs to the system from external sources
using a secure protocol.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
For our first contribution, we have demonstrated a Scalable Hardware Monitoring
Grid (SHMG) design that solves three critical problems in practical network proces-
sor systems: multiple cores, multiple processing binaries and dynamically changing
workload. SHMG provides a scalable processor-to-monitor interconnection architec-
ture to balance the area cost and the performance overhead. A resource reallocation
algorithm is proposed for reconfiguring the processor cores and hardware monitors to
adapt to the dynamically changing network traffic at runtime. Our evaluation vali-
dates the functionality of the algorithm and demonstrates that the system overhead
for our monitoring system is less than 6% compared to the processor system.
Second, we developed a Secure Dynamic Multicore Hardware Monitoring System
(SDMMon) model for secure installation of processor binaries and monitor graphs in a
system level implementation. A Merkle tree based parameterizable high-performance
hash function is presented to prevent attackers from applying a successful attack on
one network device to other devices. We have demonstrated the operation of our
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system in hardware on an FPGA-based platform. This work provides an important
contribution toward moving from device-level security to system level security in
embedded hardware monitoring.
To conclude this dissertation research, a Multicore Network Processor Security
Platform system has been implemented on an Altera DE5 board. It integrates all the
security features of SHMG and SDMMon. A hardware TPM is included in this system
to assist the key operations during processor binary and monitor graph updates. Our
evaluation shows the correctness of the system and provides for evaluation of resource
cost and performance. The resource overhead of our sytem is around 5% compared
to the multicore processor system and the maximum throughput of a four-core, six-
monitor system is 140 Mbps. Network attacks are detected within one to two clock
cycles.
7.2 Future Work
Hardware-assisted monitoring is a lightweight and efficient technique for detecting
a wide variety of attacks in embedded systems. It provides many new dimensions that
are worth exploring in future work.
Unknown indirect branches: Since the monitor graphs of the current hard-
ware monitor design are generated at compile time, a monitor can only handle indirect
branches to statically known targets (e.g., return addresses). It cannot handle indirect
branches to statically unknown targets that are resolved at run time. Although net-
work applications usually do not have such programming constructs (all 11 NpBench
benchmarks have known compile-time known targets), unknown indirect branches
exist in general purpose programs. A hardware monitor design that is able to handle
these indirect branches is desirable to make hardware monitors more applicable to
generalized systems.
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Dynamically resizable monitor: Considering that the code sizes of applica-
tions may vary greatly, a static monitor memory size which is determined by the
largest application size causes resource waste for other, smaller applications. Dy-
namic reconfiguration of the monitor memory structure could eliminate this memory
overhead. The monitoring memory could be made dynamically resizable depending
on the number of instructions or monitoring graph states in the target application.
Multiple FSMs in one monitor: A monitoring approach could be developed
which uses multiple small finite state machines rather than a single FSM in a hard-
ware monitor. This approach could potentially reduce the size of monitor graphs by
removing redundant information. In such a design, monitoring information is dis-
tributed into several small FSMs and the monitor uses these small FSMs together to
establish correct functional operation.
OS security: The hardware monitor architecture we presented in this dissertation
protects a user application from its vulnerabilities. However, it does not account for
the operating system and its vulnerability. Modern operating systems are deployed
in a large variety of embedded systems. It is desirable to apply hardware monitoring
to these OS-based systems. Some work has been done in this direction, for example,
MTHM [83] introduces a fine-grained monitoring architecture that supports multiple
contexts under the control of an operating system. However, this design does not
address the problem of OS code vulnerability.
Portable monitor: Although dedicated hardware monitors are an efficient se-
curity solution for network processors, it may not be feasible to deploy monitors
in all network routers since it requires a modification to current router architecture
that may be costly. An alternative solution that involves minimum router hard-
ware changes could be a portable monitor which is a separate device that can be
plugged into existing processor interfaces. In this way, the network processors and
the hardware monitors are independent, and the processors only need an interface to
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communicate with the monitors. In general purpose embedded processors, a portable
monitor could be a USB device or a special unit that connects to the motherboard
through PCIe. Note that this type of approach is still vulnerable to simple physical
attacks.
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APPENDIX A
SYSTEM SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we introduce the installation and configuration of µClinux [33] and
a memory management unit (MMU) on the DE5 board and the µClinux device driver
development flow. A sample kernel driver code for the TPM module is provided in
Appendix B.
A.1 Installation and Configuration of µClinux on DE5
The original µClinux was a fork of the Linux 2.0 kernel for microcontrollers in
embedded systems without a memory management unit (MMU). Today’s embedded
µClinux operating system includes Linux kernel releases for 2.0 2.4 and 2.6, as well
as a collection of user applications, libraries and tool chains. It has been widely used
in embedded systems and forms the basis of many products, such as network routers,
security cameras, DVD and MP3 players, VoIP phone and gateways, scanners, and
card readers. In our system, we use µClinux that targets 2.6 series Linux kernels.
A.1.1 Setup the Development Environment
To be able to build µClinux, a Linux based PC is required. In our case, we
used a VMware based virtual machine that installs Fedora 18 64-bit version as the
compilation environment. In the virtual machine, we downloaded the latest µClinux
distribution and precompiled NIOS II to the Linux cross complier toolchain1 2.
1http://sopc.et.ntust.edu.tw/
2ftp://ftp.altera.com/outgoing/nios2-linux/20120802
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The virtual machine for this project was obtained from http://sdrv.ms/11cMAUy
[46]. There are 43 rar files in the distribution and the total size is 22 GB. After down-
loading and unzipping these files, the virtual machine is opened with VMware, and
the development environment including the µClinux distribution and the precompiled
toolchain can then be used.
A.1.2 DeviceTree
DeviceTree is a way of describing hardware in an embedded system [44]. This
information is needed during µClinux kernel compilation so that the kernel knows
the hardware architecture of the target system. Altera Qsys doesn’t directly provide
a DeviceTree file (.dts file), it only provides a .sopcinfo file which has to be converted
to a .dts file. We use a Java program (sopc2dts) to generate device-tree sources (.dts
files) from a Qsys .sopcinfo file. JDK 1.5 or above is required to compile this tool.
To recreate our virtual machine environment, go to the directory ~/uClinux/
tools/sopc2dts, the sopc2dts tool has already been compiled and generated. Type
the following command will open the GUI of sopc2dts tool shown in Figure A.1.
$ java −j a r sopc2dts . j a r −−gui
Choose the .sopcinfo file describing your system in the “Input” tab. Look over
(and adjust) the various bits in the “Boardinfo” tab, select cpu : nios2 qsys 0 as the
master. Press apply after you’ve made a change. Check the “Output” tab to see the
effect on your generated device tree. After finishing all the changes, choose a filename
in the “Boardinfo” tab and press save. The tool would generate a .dts file based on
the input .sopcinfo file.
Since we have customized hardware components in our system (e.g. TPM module),
the description of these modules has to be encoded in the device tree. In order for
the sopc2dts software to recognize these modules, we need to modify the hw.tcl files
of these modules. A hw.tcl is a file that describes the properties and behaviors of
106
Figure A.1: GUI of sopc2dts tool
an Altera Qsys component, it allows for arbitrary name/value pairs to be assigned
to modules and to interfaces with the hw.tcl statements. At design generation time,
these assignments are put in the resulting sopcinfo file. Sopc2dts looks for these
interface and module assignments to the namespace, embeddedsw.dts., when creating
device trees. In our TPM example, we need to specify the vendor, name and group
of the TPM module using the following lines in TPM hw.tcl.
s e t module ass ignment embeddeddsw . dts . vendor ”ALTR”
set module ass ignment embeddeddsw . dts . name ”TPM”
set module ass ignment embeddeddsw . dts . group ”TPM”
A.1.3 Configure and Build µClinux
After generating a DeviceTree for the hardware system, we can use it to build a
µClinux kernel. Go to the µClinux distribution directory and set the PATH envi-
ronment variable for the toolchain.
$ export PATH=$PATH: / path/ to / n io s2 / t o o l c h a i n / bin
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Some configuration in the µClinux kernel is needed.
• Set the vendor and products.
• Set MMU support.
• Set the SDRAM memory base address.
• Set the path to the device tree source file.
• Configure the kernel features.
• Enable the Altera JTAG UART console support
• Enable the network services and cryptographic support.
These changes can be made in a GUI configuration interface with command “make
menuconfig”. Figure A.2 shows the main menu of this GUI. Go into “Vendor/Product
Selection”, select Altera as vendor and Nios II as product. Then go to “Kernel/Li-
brary/Defaults Selection”, make sure kernel is Linux-2.6.x and Libc is none. Select
“Customize Kernel Settings” and “Customize Application/Library Settings”. Save
the changes and exit.
If “Customize Kernel Settings” is selected, another GUI interface (Figure A.3)
will be open after exiting the main menu. In this kernel configuration menu, we need
to set all the kernel related configurations.
• In “Kernel features”, set the timer frequency to 1000Hz, set the memory model
to flat memory and set the low address space to 4096.
• In “Platform options”, set the SDRAM base address to 0x0, note that this base
address must match with the SDRAM base address in the Qsys project. Enable
“Compile and link device tree into kernel image” and specify the path to the
device tree source file.
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Figure A.2: µClinux GUI configuration main menu
• In “Device drivers”, go to “Character devices” and enable Altera JTAG UART
support in “Serial drivers”, set the baudrate to 115200.
If “Customize Application/Library Settings” is selected, the Application/Library
configuration GUI (Figure A.4) will be open after the kernel setting. In this GUI, we
select applications such as ftp, openssl and telnet in “Network Applications”. Note
that we need to download and compile the source files for the selected applications,
the absence of source code or errors in the source code would cause the failure of
kernel compilation.
After configuring the µClinux kernel, type make in the command line to start
building the kernel image. If the kernel image is built successfully without any com-
pilation errors, you will see a message saying:
Kernel : arch / n io s2 / boot /zImage i s ready
The kernel image is stored in uClinux-dist\linux-2.6.x/arch/nios2/boot/.
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Figure A.3: µClinux GUI kernel configuration menu
Figure A.4: µClinux GUI application configuration menu
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A.1.4 Loading µClinux onto DE5
Turn on the DE5 board and connect it with the host PC through the USB-Blaster
cable. In Quartus II, download the .sof file to the FPGA.
We use JTAG UART as a serial console to boot µClinux from memory. First, we
copy the µClinux kernel image file zImage from the virtual machine to the Windows
host machine and save it under the path_to_DE5_project/sw directory. Then we
open the Altera Nios2 command shell from the Tools tab in Qsys, and change the
command shell path to path_to_DE5_project/sw. Next, we download the kernel
image into the memory on the board with this command:
$ nios2−download −c 1 −g zImage
After downloading the kernel, we use nios2-terminal to see the output from the
µClinux boot up. Note that cygwin must be installed in your machine to support the
Nios2 command shell.
$ nios2−t e rmina l
If the kernel boots up successfully, you should see messages similar to Figure A.5.
A.2 µClinux Device Driver Development
Now that we have a functioning µClinux system up and running, the next im-
portant step is to write device drivers for the kernel to support the custom hardware
that we added in Qsys. We use our TPM driver as a sample design to illustrate the
driver development process.
A.2.1 Introduction of Linux Device Driver
In compute systems, a device driver is a computer program that provides a soft-
ware interface for the operating systems and other computer programs to interact
with a hardware device without needing to know details of the hardware. This in-
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Figure A.5: µClinux boot up messages
terface is designed so that drivers can be built separately from the rest of the kernel
and plugged in at runtime when needed [28].
The Linux way of looking at device drivers distinguishes between three fundamen-
tal device types: char device, block device, and network device.
• Character devices: A character (char) device is one that can be accessed as a
stream of bytes. It is the most common type of device driver. There are several
fundamental system calls that need to be implemented in a char type device
driver including open, close, read and write. User applications treat the char
driver like reading and writing to a file. The text console and the serial ports
are common examples of char devices.
• Block devices: A block device is a device that can host a filesystem, it handles
I/O operations that transfer one or more whole blocks (512 byte or a larger
power of two). A typical example of block device is a disk.
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• Network devices: A network driver handles the packet sends and receives from a
network interface with other hosts. It is only used for hardware that is involved
with data transfer using TCP/IP protocol.
The device driver we developed is a character driver.
A.2.2 User Space and Kernel Space
System memory in Linux can be divided into two distinct regions: kernel space
and user space. Kernel space is where the core of the operating system stores and
executes, while user space is a set of locations where normal user processes run.
The kernel has full access to all memory and machine hardware, whereas processes
running under user space have access only to a limited part of memory. User space
processes can only access a small part of the kernel via system calls. If a user space
process performs a system call, a software interrupt is sent to the kernel. The kernel
dispatches an appropriate interrupt handler to take care of this system call.
A Linux device driver runs in kernel space. It implements system calls such
as open, close, read and write. A user space program uses these system calls to
communicate with the driver and the driver is in charge of accessing the hardware.
Figure A.6 shows the relationship between user space, kernel space and hardware.
User Space
( Applications )
Kernel Space
( Modules or 
Drivers )
Hardware
System
calls
Figure A.6: User space, Kernel space and Hardware
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A.2.3 Implementation of the driver
This section describes how to write a complete char device driver. The first step
of driver writing is defining the capabilities the driver will offer to user programs. In
our TPM sample design, our driver will open a hardware device and read keys from
it, writing to the hardware is not needed. As a result, the driver needs to support
open, close and read file operations.
Table A.1 lists all the device events that our driver needs to support and their
associated user space and kernel space functions. User functions are implemented as
statements that the user application can use in the C or C++ programs or Linux
shell commands. The users interact with the kernel through these functions. Ker-
nel functions are implemented in the device driver. They interact directly with the
hardware and send feedback to the user functions.
Table A.1: Device events and their associated interfacing functions
Event User Function (User Program) Kernel Function (Driver)
Load Module insmod module init()
Open Device fopen file operation: open
Read Device fread file operation: read
Close Device fclose file operation: release
Remove Module rmmod module exit()
The module initiate functionmodule init() and the module exit functionmodule exit()
are the two most essential functions in a driver. Any char device driver has to at least
implement these two functions. They register the driver in the kernel and release the
driver from the kernel system.
In module init(), the classic way to register a char device driver is to use API
function register chrdev.
int r e g i s t e r c h r d e v (unsigned int major , const char ∗name ,
struct f i l e o p e r a t i o n s ∗ f ops ) ;
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Here, major is the unique major number that is either assigned by the driver
developer or assigned by the kernel automatically for each driver, name is the name
of the driver, and fops is the default file operations defined in the driver. The file
operation is a struct code that contain pointers to all functions in the driver. The
driver uses these pointers to forward user application requests to the correct handlers.
In module exit(), the driver uses unregister chrdev to remove the driver from the
kernel system and release all memory that has been allocated to the driver.
The Linux command insmod and rmmod are used to load and remove loadable
modules to the kernel system in the Linux console.
As shown in Table A.1, the driver has open and release functions to handle user
space requests from fopen and fclose. The content of these function is based on the
hardware specification. If the driver needs initialization before the read or write to
the hardware, it can be initialized in the open function. If the driver needs clean up
after the read or write, the release function can be used.
The read function in the driver must read a whole segment of data from the
hardware and copy it to the user space. These capabilities are offered by the following
kernel functions:
unsigned inb (unsigned port ) ;
unsigned inw (unsigned port ) ;
unsigned i n l (unsigned port ) ;
unsigned long copy to u s e r ( void u s e r ∗ to , const void ∗ from ,
unsigned long n ) ;
The first three functions are inline functions defined in the Linux kernel headers
(<asm/io.h>) to access hardware I/O ports. They are used to read from hardware
ports in 1 byte, 2 bytes or 4 bytes increments. After a value is read from the hardware,
the copy to user function is used to copy this value to the user program. In this
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function, to is the destination address in user space, from is the source address in
kernel space, and n is the number of bytes to copy.
After we have implemented all five kernel functions in the driver, the driver code
is ready. The driver can be added into the µClinux kernel image.
• Copy the driver source code to linux-2.6.x\source\drivers\misc.
• Add an option to Kconfig in linux-2.6.x\source\drivers\misc. This action
adds an entry in the GUI configuration tool for users to select this driver.
c o n f i g TPM
t r i s t a t e ”Example TPM d r i v e r module”
he lp
Enable example TPM module .
• Add object file to Makefile in linux-2.6.x\source\drivers\misc.
obj−$ (CONFIG TPM) += TPM. o
• Add this device to the file system by adding the following line to vendors\
Altera\nios2\device_table.txt.
/dev/TPM c 666 0 0 240 0 − − −
• Type command “make menuconfig”. In the GUI interface, go to “Device Drivers
→ Misc devices” and select the TPM driver module as shown in Figure A.7.
• Type command “make”. This action rebuilds the µClinux kernel, and the new
kernel image includes our TPM driver module.
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Figure A.7: Select the TPM driver in the configuration GUI
A.2.4 User space program
When the TPM driver is compiled in the kernel, a user space program can access
it as a file using normal file operations such as fopen, fclose, fread and fwrite.
For example, the following code will open the TPM driver for reading and return a
pointer to a FILE object that is used to identify the stream on all further operations.
If the open fails, a null pointer is returned.
FILE ∗ opntest ;
Opntest = fopen ( ”/dev/TPM” , ” r ” ) ;
A simple user space program is provided in Appendix C as an example to show
how a user space program access the driver. It reads a 32-bit value from the hardware
TPM module and prints it out. It is necessary to cross-compile user-space programs
for the NIOS II on a host machine. We use a nios2-linux-gnu-gcc cross-complier to
compile a C source code.
nios2−l inux−gnu−gcc source . c −o output b in
Copy the output bin to /romfs/bin/ and recompile the kernel to create a new
zImage that includes the user program.
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APPENDIX B
TPM SAMPLE COMPONENT KERNEL DRIVER C
CODE
#include <l i nux / i n i t . h>
#include <l i nux / ke rne l . h> /∗ p r i n t k ( ) ∗/
#include <l i nux /module . h>
#include <l i nux /mm. h>
#include <l i nux / f s . h>
#include <asm/ uacce s s . h>
#include <asm/ i o . h>
#include <asm/asm−o f f s e t s . h>
/∗ major numbers f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the d e v i c e f i l e s ∗/
#define DATA MAJOR 240
/∗ r e g i s t e r a d d r e s s e s ∗/
#define DATA REGISTER 0x08002000
MODULEAUTHOR( ”Kekai Hu” ) ;
MODULE LICENSE( ”GPL” ) ;
MODULE DESCRIPTION( ”Module which c r e a t e s dev i ce handler f o r /dev/TPM” ) ;
MODULE SUPPORTED DEVICE( ”none” ) ;
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/∗ d e v i c e f i l e s open? ∗/
int d a t i s o p e n = 0 ;
/∗ c a l l e d when data d e v i c e f i l e i s opened ∗/
stat ic int dat open ( struct inode ∗ inode , struct f i l e ∗ f i l e )
{
i f ( d a t i s o p e n++)
return −EBUSY;
t ry module get (THIS MODULE) ;
return 0 ;
}
stat ic int d a t r e l e a s e ( struct inode ∗ inode , struct f i l e ∗ f i l e )
{
−−d a t i s o p e n ;
module put (THIS MODULE) ;
return 0 ;
}
/∗ c a l l e d when a proces s reads from data f i l e ∗/
stat ic s s i z e t dat read ( struct f i l e ∗ f i l p , char ∗ bu f f e r ,
s i z e t length , l o f f t ∗ o f f s e t )
{
/∗ us ing i n l to read from hardware ,
note t h a t we have to use ioremap to map
the p h y s i c a l address to v i r t u a l address f i r s t
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b e f o r e us ing i n l to read ∗/
unsigned int data buf ;
p r in tk ( ”Reading . . . \ n” ) ;
int iomem∗ membase ;
membase = ioremap (DATA REGISTER, 4 ) ;
data buf = i n l (membase + o f f s e t ) ;
c opy to u s e r ( bu f f e r , &data buf , 4 ) ;
return 1 ;
}
/∗ d e f i n i t i o n s , which f u n c t i o n s are c a l l e d f o r / dev /TPM ∗/
stat ic struct f i l e o p e r a t i o n s f op s da t =
{
. read= dat read ,
. open= dat open ,
. r e l e a s e= d a t r e l e a s e
} ;
/∗ i n i t i a l i z e the module ∗/
stat ic int i n i t mod in i t ( void )
{
i f ( r e g i s t e r c h r d e v (DATA MAJOR, ”TPM” , &fop s da t ) )
{
pr in tk ( ” r e g i s t e r c h r d e v o f h e l l o f a i l e d !\n” ) ;
return −EIO ;
}
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pr in tk ( ”TPM d r i v e r Module i s a c t i v e \n” ) ;
return 0 ;
}
/∗ e x i t the module ∗/
stat ic void e x i t mod exit ( void )
{
u n r e g i s t e r c h r d e v (DATA MAJOR, ”TPM” ) ;
pr in tk ( ”Module i s r e l e a s e d \n” ) ;
}
/∗ what are the module i n i t / e x i t f u n c t i o n s ∗/
modu l e in i t ( mod in i t ) ;
module ex i t ( mod exit ) ;
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APPENDIX C
SAMPLE USER SPACE C CODE
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <uni s td . h>
int main ( )
{
FILE ∗ opntest ;
opntest = fopen ( ”/dev/TPM” , ” r ” ) ;
unsigned int temp = 0 ;
f r ead (&temp , 4 , 1 , opntest ) ;
f c l o s e ( opntest ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Input va lue from hardware i s : %x\n” , temp ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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